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In this article, we propose an agent-based model of opinion diffusion and voting where influence among individuals and
deliberation in a group are mixed. The model is inspired from social modeling, as it describes an iterative process of collective
decision-making that repeats a series of interindividual influences and collective deliberation steps, and studies the evolution of
opinions and decisions in a group. It also aims at founding a comprehensive model to describe collective decision-making as a
combination of two different paradigms: argumentation theory and ABM-influence models, which are not obvious to combine
as a formal link between them is required. In our model, we find that deliberation, through the exchange of arguments, reduces
the variance of opinions and the proportion of extremists in a population as long as not too much deliberation takes place in the
decision processes. Additionally, if we define the correct collective decisions in the system in terms of the arguments that should
be accepted, allowing for more deliberation favors convergence towards the correct decisions.
1. Introduction
In a group, opinions are formed over affinities and conflicts
among the individuals that compose it. Axelrod [1], a pioneer
in opinion dynamics, cast light on two key factors required
to model the processes of diffusion, namely, social influence
(i.e., individuals become more similar when they interact)
and homophily (i.e., individuals interact preferentially with
similar others). He was the first to show that a radical
differentiation of culture in a group could emerge from simple
imitation through dyadic interactions. His results suggested
that interactions through homophily and social influence
could lead to collective states or collective opinions whose
explanation, in many situations, went beyond the individual
or micro level. Further, it was found that these collective
states could be characterized by quantities like statistical
distributions and averages, which explains why, in recent
years, a growing body of research has endeavored to identify
the conditions under which social influence at the micro
(dyadic)-level translates into macropatterns of diffusion
through repeated iterations [2]. In particular, several models
have been developed to reproduce the emergent properties of
opinion diffusion which may be classified in two groups: on
the one hand, the discrete opinion models where opinions,
or other ontological equivalents, take discrete values [3, 4];
on the other, the continuous opinion models where opinions
are represented by real numbers [5–10].
In the context of continuous opinion dynamics intro-
duced by Deffuant et al. [6], and later extended by other
authors to include network effects [10, 11], trust [12], and
many other social phenomena [7], individuals meet in ran-
dom pair-wise encounters and then converge to a common
opinion if and only if their respective opinions are suffi-
ciently close to each other, in a kind of bounded confidence
mechanism based on confirmation bias. After some transient
evolution and social dynamics, this leads to final states in
which either full consensus is reached or the population splits
into a finite number of clusters such that all individuals in one
cluster share the same opinion. So far, thesemodels have been
mostly applied to political issues such as societal cleavages
and the emergence of extremism.
However, these representations of social interactions in
opinion dynamics fail to take into account everyday com-
munication settings that characterize democracies such as
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meetings, debate arenas, and the Media in which individuals
exchange points of view and can influence one another
in a collective manner. In effect, individual actions that
translate into collective decisions, such as voting, are shaped
by factors related to the structure and size of the channels
of communication and deliberation. When a group engages
in a collective discussion, group size, what arguments are
advanced, how discussion is organized over time, and the
acceptability criteria for proposals may lead to a transfor-
mation of preferences [13] and play a crucial role in con-
sensus formation [14–16]. For instance, work in [14] defends
that deliberation polarizes individuals in the direction of
their initial opinions due to social pressure and to limited
knowledge (biased or unbalanced argument pool) within
the discussing group. In contrast, from several empirical
studies of deliberation processes, other authors infer that
deliberation can have a stabilizing or moderating effect on
opinions [16, 17], which they interpret as opinions becoming
more informed [18], balanced, and/or confused [13]. Authors
in [15] express that deliberation may encourage moderate
opinion consensuses if it is procedural, or be polarizing if
it ego-involves the participants. All these phenomena may
introduce some degree of discrepancy into the otherwise
well-known steady states of opinions (clusters) obtained in
classical opinion dynamics and should be modeled some-
how.
Opinion diffusion has also been used to track conver-
gence towards “correct” or accurate opinions in groups.
Although authors in [19] study how interactions among
agents diffuse true information, they focus their analyses on
network effects and noisy signaling, and not on deliberation
protocols. In [20], Rouchier and Tanimura explore the dif-
fusion of information about an exogenous “true state” of the
world (represented by bits) through social interactions and
learning but assume the interactions to be only dyadic andnot
deliberative. In our context, a correct decision corresponds
to one derived from a dialectical situation in which all
the arguments for and against a proposed alternative are
taken into account [15]. The existence of an ideal criteria of
correctness of collective decisions can be used to evaluate the
outcome of deliberative procedures and democratic decision-
making. Since deliberation imposes regulatory conditions to
decision-making processes, one may attribute a rational and
democratic value to the collective decisions obtained from it.
Deliberation is a way of getting closer to the ideal state in
which a group judges propositions as if it had all arguments
at its disposal. In [18], Barabas shows empirical evidence that
deliberation increases knowledge and is correlated to correct
responses to objective questions. Up until now, opinion
diffusion models have not taken into account this dimension
and models mixing deliberative and dyadic interactions may
well do so. In the same manner, collective truth-seeking
models can benefit frommore insight on processes of peer-to-
peer information diffusion of the like of continuous opinion
dynamics models.
From a social welfare perspective, a claim in favor
of deliberation is that promoting dialogue leads to better
decision-making, where “better” goes as improving social
welfare. Preference structures that are rationally untenable
or unjustifiable are eliminated from the pool of admissible
preferences outright [21]. We argue that different ways of
partaking deliberation, e.g. the structure and protocol of
decision-making processes, may allow for more accurate
collective decision-making.
In this direction, agent-based modeling proves to be
an interesting method to study and observe the effect of
deliberation on opinions. For one, it helps infer knowledge
from models in which a multiplicity of different modes
of communication among heterogeneous agents are, ana-
lytically, difficult to describe; second, given that empirical-
based conclusions on the topic may be costly and difficult
to ascertain due to confronting ideologies and theories on
the topic (see [15, 16]), it provides an alternative way of
testing the effects of collective decisions and deliberation
protocols on public opinion; and, not an exhaustive third, it
furnishes an interesting modeling environment for collective
choice analysis by giving the possibility to account for dif-
ferent levels of decision-making and a diversity of influence
loops.
The aim of ourmodel is to breach a gap between delibera-
tion and opinion diffusion.Wemodel dyadic or ego-involved
dynamics using an opinion diffusion model based on social
judgment theory [9, 22], whereas formal or deliberative
discussion is modeled using abstract argumentation theory
[23–25]. We build a process of collective decision-making
where deliberation and voting are necessary conditions for
collective choice as we are inspired from results in the
deliberative democracy [16, 17, 26] and social psychology
[14, 15] literature. We present the effects of deliberation on
the opinions of a group and on its ability to correctly judge
propositions.We call the latter the group’s judgment accuracy.
We also observe how deliberation impacts a group’s ability to
eventually vote in favor of proposals that are discussed and
accepted during deliberation, in other words, on the group’s
coherence in decision-making. Furthermore, since a collective
decision in the model is an outcome of a structured group
decision-making process, a sequence of deliberative and
dyadic interactions among agents, we seek to study the impact
of its structure on the group’s opinions, judgment accuracy,
and coherence. The frequency of deliberative interactions
within a decision-making process, the size of deliberation
(number of agents that deliberate), and the majority voting
rules used determine the collective acceptance of proposals
are considered to this end. Ultimately, we strive to create a
tool that helps policy-makers analyze deliberation protocols
and make studied decisions about them.
Our model allows us to explore a new paradigm in opin-
ion diffusion and answer the following research questions
concerning decision-making in groups:
(1) What effect can deliberation have on a group’s opin-
ion distribution when the opinion dynamics are
described using bounded confidencemodels? In what
way are opinion dynamics through deliberation alone
interesting?
(2) How do the structure and protocol of deliberative
decision-making processes affect a group’s distribu-
tion of opinions, coherence, and judgment accuracy?
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(3) In what way can controlling for protocol relate to
social situations in which collective decisions are
coherent and accurate?
Simulations show that deliberation yields, on average,
qualitative loose consensus and group polarization while
reducing the number of different opinion clusters over the
distribution of opinions. In effect, our model shows that
deliberation has a significant overall impact on the distribu-
tion of opinions (on its variance) and on the shifts in individ-
ual opinion. In particular, when specifying opinion dynamics
as only deliberative, the proportion of extremists and the
variance of opinions are lower and the shifts of opinions
greater than in a nondeliberative, dyadic opinion dynamics
model. However, when considering a mix of deliberation
and dyadic interactions, parameters that promote bigger
or more frequent deliberation during decision-making pro-
cesses increase the variance of opinions and the proportion
of extremists and limit the effect of deliberation on opinions.
The majority voting quota rule to accept a proposal plays a
preponderant role as it determines if the consensus-driving
power of deliberation outweighs the propensity to dissensus
observed in bounded-confidence models with rejection.
Themodel sheds light on the fact that a group’s coherence
and judgment accuracy may depend significantly on how
decision processes are structured. The number of debates
allowed and the number of agents that may participate in
them increase judgment accuracy in a marginally decreasing
fashion but have little or no effect on the group’s coherence
in decision-making. Last, we point out that results are
conditioned on how many arguments agents have at their
disposal and on how they advance them during deliberation.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: in
Section 2, we present the model and provide some necessary
basics to understand its implementation; in the subsequent
section, we introduce the metrics of interest and the cali-
bration of the model. In Section 4, we report and discuss
the results of the simulations; and in Sections 5 and 6,
respectively, we survey related work and we conclude the
article.
2. A Model for Collective Decision-Making
with Deliberation
We propose a system of collective decision-making among
agents made of three objects: arguments, agents, and tables
for deliberation. Agents have agency, arguments represent
pieces of information, and tables validate collective decisions
while organizing all deliberative interactions among agents.
2.1. Model Overview. In this section, we propose an overview
of themodel.We quickly introduce the agents and the objects
that make collective decisions possible in the multiagent
system.We also provide a basic interpretation of the collective
decision-making procedure, which we illustrate with an
example.
2.1.1. Overview of Agents and Objects in the Model. Argu-
ments are objects that relate to each other by a defeat relation.
They are characterized by their support of some value or
principle. Agents are characterized by their sensitivity to
deliberated ideas, by the arguments they possess, which
reflect their opinions, and their knowledge about arguments.
They communicate one-to-one or collectively by the dint of
arguments in a public arena. Communication leads them to
an eventual update of their opinions. Tables are entities that
contain both: agents and arguments.They are controlled by a
central authority (CA) [27] that fixes the rules in the delib-
eration process, the frequency of deliberative interactions,
and the conditions for collective acceptability of deliberated
information. The existence of a central authority, namely, a
person or a machine that can reveal the correct epistemic
status of any set of arguments can be equated to Habermas’
claim that the “unforced force of the better argument” will
triumph in an ideal speech situation1. A central authoritymay
also be associated with Rancie`re’s notion of “police” that he
defines as “an order of bodies that defines the allocation of
ways of doing, ways of being, and ways of saying, and that
sees that those bodies are assigned by name to a particular
place and task” [28] (p.29).
2.1.2. Overview of the Decision-Making Process. Let 𝑁 be a
group of agents that is asked to deliberate and vote on a
proposal P. Given an argument 𝐼 in favor of P, they have
to judge on whether P is desirable or not. The argument𝐼 or proposal argument determines how much the proposal
supports a principle P or its opposite ¬P. A proposal
is a sentence that indicates a way of attaining a goal or
solving a problem. A principle derives from the notion of
value—values seen as fundamental social or personal goods
that are desirable in themselves [29]. Environmentalism and
patriotism are examples of values; to choose proposals that
minimize environmental impact or maximize welfare are
examples of two not mutually exclusive principles.
Agents are assumed to decide on the acceptance of the
proposal on the basis of their opinions or their adherence
to the said principle, whether they argue formally or infor-
mally about P. When agents are not deliberating, they are
subject to random pair-wise influence; when the deliberative
exchange of arguments concludes, they are influenced by the
acceptance status of the proposal that is being discussed.
Only a fraction of all agents deliberate in each deliberative
exchange; all agents are prone to pair-wise discussion. They
vote for proposals according to their opinions. A proposal
P is accepted if and only if the argument 𝐼 that is given
with it is accepted after deliberation and the proposal is voted
favorably by amajority of agents. To vote in favor of a proposal
is considered to be equivalent to accepting the argument that
comes along with it.
Example 1. P = “Protect the environment” is a principle; a
proposal may be P = “Reduce carbon emissions by 2030
using electric cars.” To justify the proposal, one may advance
the argument 𝐼 = “Electric cars will reduce society’s depen-
dency on fossil fuels and will result in a reduction of carbon
emissions for 2030 while proctecting the environment” that
expresses the degree to which the proposal is in line with
environmental protection. An argument that tackles the
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Figure 1: Argumentation framework 𝐴𝐹 = (A,R) with A ={𝑎, 𝑏, 𝑐} andR = {(𝑎, 𝑏), (𝑏, 𝑐)}. The labeling {{𝑏}, {𝑐}, {𝑎}} is conflict-
free; {{𝑎, 𝑐}, {𝑏}, 0} is the only complete labeling.
proposal argument 𝐼 and that opposes the principle P could
be 𝑎 = “Electric cars may protect the environment by
reducing effective carbon emissions but the batteries they
depend on are very pollutant”. The proposal P may be
accepted in the deliberation arena if some other argument
that defeats 𝑎, say 𝑏 = “Battery recycling businesses are
hatching everywhere. By 2020, it is very likely that scientists
find a viable solution to chemical pollution due to batteries” is
advanced. It is not accepted otherwise. If 𝐼 is accepted, thenP
is collectively accepted if a majority of agents vote favorably
for it.
2.2. Arguments as the Basic Units of Collective Discussion
among Agents. In this subsection, we introduce the sim-
plest object in our system: arguments. We present abstract
argumentation theory and Caminada’s labeling approach to
argumentation [30] that allows us to track the epistemic status
of arguments during deliberation.
2.2.1. Arguments. Arguments are objects that represent pieces
of information that agents can understand. They are infor-
mational cues that enable agents to discuss with one another
in a public, collective context and make decisions on the
acceptability of other pieces of information.They are assumed
to be nonfallacious. In our approach, each argument 𝑎 is
modeled by a real number V𝑎 ∈ [−1, 1] that stands for
how much 𝑎 respects or supports the principle P. V𝑎 = 1
means that argument 𝑎 is totally coherent with the principle
P, whereas V𝑎 = −1 reads that 𝑎 is totally incoherent with
the principle P. Arguments relate to each other through an
incompatibility relation that states that one cannot stand
behind two conflicting arguments. Arguments are also char-
acterized by their acceptability status that indicates whether
they are accepted, refuted, or undecided in a given discur-
sive context. Arguments have an epistemic reach (𝑒𝑟) or a
maximum number of arguments they can attack. This can
be interpreted as the argument’s level of generality or as the
potential level of argumentative conflict within the argument
pool.
2.2.2. Abstract Argumentation Theory. Deliberation, defined
as an exchange of arguments, is modeled by confronting rep-
resentations of different, eventually contending, arguments.
In our model, we use abstract argumentation theory [23] to
represent deliberation, where an argument is just a node in a
graph, like arguments 𝑎, 𝑏, and 𝑐 in Figure 1. Abstract argu-
mentation theorymodels incompatibility between arguments
and abstracts away from their internal structure.The intuition
is that if an argument 𝑎 attacks an argument 𝑏 (represented
by an arrow from node 𝑎 to node 𝑏, as in Figure 1), a rational
agent cannot accept both 𝑎 and 𝑏.
Formally, let A be a finite set of arguments and R a
subset of A × A called attack relation. The attack relation is
intransitive and we note (𝑎, 𝑏) ∈ R the fact that argument 𝑎
attacks or is incompatible with argument 𝑏. One says that an
argument 𝑎 defends an argument 𝑐, noted (𝑎, 𝑐) ∈ D, if there
exists an argument 𝑏 such that (𝑎, 𝑏) ∈ R and (𝑏, 𝑐) ∈ R
(see Figure 1). An argumentation framework (𝐴𝐹 = (A,R))
is a digraph in which the nodes represent the arguments
and the arcs represent the attacks among them. Given an
argumentation framework𝐴𝐹, the classic problem in abstract
argumentation resides in finding which of the arguments in𝐴𝐹 can be accepted, rejected, or left undecided.
In the labeling approach [30], a label L𝑎𝑏(𝑎) ∈ Λ ={𝑖𝑛, 𝑜𝑢𝑡, 𝑢𝑛𝑑} of an argument 𝑎 ∈ A denotes the epistemic
status of 𝑎. Intuitively, an argument is labeled 𝑖𝑛 if it is
justifiable and 𝑜𝑢𝑡 if it is not. If 𝑎 is labeled 𝑢𝑛𝑑, it is
considered to be in abeyance due to, for example, insufficient
grounds for it to be labeled 𝑖𝑛 or 𝑜𝑢𝑡. Furthermore, given an
argumentation framework 𝐴𝐹 = (A,R), one calls labeling a
complete function
L : A 󳨀→ Λ = {𝑖𝑛, 𝑜𝑢𝑡, 𝑢𝑛𝑑}
𝑎 󳨃󳨀→L𝑎𝑏 (𝑎) (1)
that assigns a label to each argument in 𝐴𝐹. A labeling is
written as a triplet⨉𝜆∈Λ𝜆L(A) where 𝜆L(A) = {𝑎 ∈ A |
L𝑎𝑏(𝑎) = 𝜆}. For example, 𝑖𝑛 L(A) stands for the set of
arguments in A that are labeled 𝑖𝑛 in the labelingL(A). A
labeling is said to be legal if all argument it labels is legally
labeled. An argument 𝑎 ∈ A is said to be legally labeled
(i) L𝑎𝑏(𝑎) = 𝑖𝑛, if ∀𝑏 ∈ A s.t (𝑏, 𝑎) ∈R,L𝑎𝑏(𝑏) = 𝑜𝑢𝑡:
if 𝑎 is not attacked or is only attacked by arguments
that are themselves labeled 𝑜𝑢𝑡;
(ii) L𝑎𝑏(𝑎) = 𝑜𝑢𝑡, if ∃𝑏 ∈ A s.t (𝑏, 𝑎) ∈R,L𝑎𝑏(𝑏) = 𝑖𝑛,
that is if 𝑎 is attacked by at least one argument that is
labeled 𝑖𝑛;
(iii) L𝑎𝑏(𝑎) = 𝑢𝑛𝑑, if ¬(∀𝑏 ∈ A s.t (𝑏, 𝑎) ∈ R,L𝑎𝑏(𝑏) =
𝑜𝑢𝑡) ∧ (∀𝑐 ∈ A s.t (𝑐, 𝑎) ∈ R,La𝑏(𝑐) ̸= 𝑖𝑛);
or equivalently, if there exists at least one argument
labeled 𝑢𝑛𝑑 that attacks 𝑎 and there is no argument
labeled 𝑖𝑛 attacking 𝑎.
Roughly speaking, a semantics (denoted by 𝜎) is a rationality
criteria to decide which arguments to accept given an argu-
mentation framework. The basic normative requirements
for labeling-based semantics and argument acceptability
in abstract argumentation repose on conflict-free labelings
or labelings in which no two 𝑖𝑛-labeled arguments attack
each other, and admissible labelings, which are conflict-
free labelings that ask for arguments that are defended by
the 𝑖𝑛-labeled arguments to be themselves 𝑖𝑛-labeled. The
family of admissibility-based labelings goes from complete
labelings to preferred and grounded labelings which are
complete labelings that capture properties such as credulity
and skepticism in argumentation. Formally, a labelingL for
the arguments in an argumentation framework (A,R) is said
to be
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(i) conflict-free if ∄𝑎, 𝑏 ∈ A s.t (𝑎, 𝑏) ∈ R ∧ 𝑎, 𝑏 ∈
𝑖𝑛L(A);
(ii) admissible if conflict-free and ∀𝑎 ∈ A,L𝑎𝑏(𝑎) ̸=
𝑢𝑛𝑑 󳨐⇒ 𝑎 is legallyL𝑎𝑏(𝑎);
(iii) complete if admissible and ∀𝑎 ∈ A,L𝑎𝑏(𝑎) =
𝑢𝑛𝑑 󳨐⇒ 𝑎 is legally labeled 𝑢𝑛𝑑;
(iv) preferred if complete and if it maximizes 𝑖𝑛L(A);
(v) grounded if complete and if it maximizes 𝑢𝑛𝑑L(A).
We choose admissibility-based semantics because, for one,
they supply a comprehensive model of collective reasoning;
they allow for a meaningful parameterization of credulous
and skeptical collective reasoning, and, last, they are relatively
easy to interpret since the differences between them are
well documented in the literature (e.g. [18]). Additionally
and in contrast to other rank-based or graded semantics in
abstract argumentation, admissibility semantics assume that
all arguments have the same weight.
2.2.3. Abstract Argumentation and Discursive Situations in
Collective Decision-Making. Abstract argumentation is a
convenient formalism for argument-based decision-making
since it ignores difficulties relative to the nature, generation,
and number of arguments and posits the possibility of using
graph theoretic tools to model (collective) reasoning in a
clear, coherent, and easy way [31]. Example 2 below provides
a simple overview of a debate between two agents over the
acceptability of the proposal “Tax the rich.”
Example 2. Let P = “Tax the rich” and P = “Liberalism.”
Figure 1 represents the abstract argumentation framework
obtained from the following arguments:
(i) 𝐼 = 𝑐 = “Only the rich should be taxed because they
possess most of the capital in the country”;
(ii) 𝑏 = “If you only tax the rich, the rich will leave and
then you’ll have no one to tax”;
(iii) 𝑎 = “The rich will not leave because they have their
livelihoods here and it would cost themmore to leave
than to pay the taxes.”
Agent 1 advances the proposal argument 𝑐, agent 2 argues
that, given the justification 𝑐 for P, P is not tenable. Agent
1 defends his proposal by advancing 𝑎 and defeating the
argument 𝑏.The conclusion is that holding 𝑐 and 𝑎 is a tenable
position, so the rich should be taxed. Notice that by simply
accepting 𝑐 and taking no position on 𝑏 nor 𝑎 is conflict-free
and still corresponds to the position advocating that the rich
should be taxed.
Abstract argumentation comes as an immediate appli-
cation to our model in the construction of an ideal argu-
mentation framework that loosely models Habermas’ ideal
speech situation. The ideal speech situation is important in
our work because it corresponds to a normative state that is,
in practice, difficult to reach and that allows us to observe
how different deliberation protocols affect deliberative out-
comes.
In the model, a label given to an argument, provided
a semantics 𝜎, is said to be ideal if it is obtained from a
state of affairs in which all arguments are presented during
deliberation. We call ideal or consensual argumentation
framework the argumentation framework (A,R) = 𝐴𝐹𝜀
containing all arguments in the system and all consensual
attacks among them. In a multiagent approach, a consensual
attack between two arguments 𝑎, 𝑏 ∈ A is a couple (𝑎, 𝑏)
such that (𝑎, 𝑏) ∈ R if and only if a certain majority of
agents recognizes that such attack exists. In our model, all
agents agree on the attack relation over 𝐴𝐹𝜀. It follows that
if two agents advance two distinct arguments 𝑎, 𝑏 ∈ A such
that (𝑎, 𝑏) ∈ R, then all agents will recognize that such
conflict exists. An immediate consequence of this assumption
is that all deliberated results are consensual, even if an opinion
consensus2 on the principle is not necessarily reached.
2.3. Deliberative Social Agents. In this section we present
the agents in our model. We define them on the basis
of their opinions on the principle P, the arguments they
possess, their knowledge of the relationship among them,
their behavior during deliberation, and their sensitivity to
deliberated proposals.
2.3.1. Agents in Dyadic Social Interactions. Every agent 𝑖 has
an opinion, a relative position or degree of adherence 𝑜𝑖 ∈[−1, 1] to a principle P, and a couple (𝑈𝑖, 𝑇𝑖) ∈ [0, 2] × [0, 2]
(𝑈𝑖 ≤ 𝑇𝑖) of latitudes of acceptance and rejection, respectively,
of informational cues. They live in [0, 2] since 0 and 2 are,
respectively, the minimum and maximum distances of any
two informational cues in the system. The idea behind the
couple (𝑈𝑖, 𝑇𝑖) is that there exist levels of relative tolerance
from which informational cues have either an attractive or
a repulsive effect on the individual [22, 32]. An 𝑜𝑖 close to 1
implies that agent 𝑖 fully supports the principle P, and close
to -1 that she rejects principleP or, equivalently, fully supports¬P. Moreover, if an agent 𝑖’s opinion is such that |𝑜𝑖| ≥ 0.75,𝑖 is considered to have an extreme opinion, a moderate one
otherwise. 𝑈𝑖 may be considered as 𝑖’s uncertainty about her
own opinion [33] or as the limit below which the object
she judges may attract her. 𝑇𝑖 may be seen as 𝑖’s bound of
tolerance from which informational cues disgust her and
confirmher initial position.Different combinations of (𝑈𝑖,𝑇𝑖)
can be associated with agent 𝑖’s ego or personal involvement
in discussion processes, as it is vividly explained in [32].
Finally, agents are assumed to be sincere and precise when
communicating their positions to one another (no noise in
the interactions).
2.3.2. Agents in Deliberative Social Interactions. Agents vote
and participate in deliberation because they are aware of
the potential changes an accepted proposal may induce in
the opinion of the group. After all, proposals promote a
principle that potentially leads to a shift in other agents’
opinions. Agents’ incentive to participate in deliberation is
based on the idea that every single one of them wants to
make her point across and, at the same time, reach a correct
collective decision. Agents are endowed with a probability,
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Adherence to principle
Figure 2: Representation of agents and their arguments on the
opinion or adherence to the principles spectrum. The rectangles
on the agents are their argument sacks. Arguments are depicted by
dots and arrows from the arguments to the sacks depict both the
arguments they hold in the opinion spectrum and the number of
arguments they hold: 𝑘𝑖 = 4 and 𝜙𝑒𝑖 = 0.75, and 𝜙𝑚𝑖 = 0.5 for all
agent 𝑖.
𝑥𝑖 = 𝑓(𝑑(𝑜𝑖, V𝐼), 𝑝𝑎), of being attracted to a deliberated cue
and a probability of being repulsed by it, 𝑦𝑖 = 𝑔(𝑑(𝑜𝑖, V𝐼), 𝑝𝑟).
The two probabilities are assumed to be independent. They
are a function of the distance between the opinion and
the proposal argument and of the group’s sensitivity3 to
deliberation (𝑝𝑎, 𝑝𝑟). The former is decreasing on 𝑑(𝑜𝑖, V𝐼)
and increasing on 𝑝𝑎, while the latter is increasing on both𝑑(𝑜𝑖, V𝐼) and 𝑝𝑟. Agents are also assumed
(i) to be capable of assessing the degree of support for P
of all arguments;
(ii) to trust4 one another when they utter informational
cues.
2.3.3. Agents and Voting. At the end of the decision-making
process, agents vote on whether they agree or not on the pro-
posal argument that has been discussed during deliberation.
Voting, for an agent, is the expression of her opinion in the
final phase of the decision-making process. An agent 𝑖 is said
to vote favorably for a proposal P of justification argument𝐼 if and only if V𝐼 × 𝑜𝑖 ≥ 0 or, equivalently, if the proposal
argument does not adhere to the opposite of the principle 𝑖
supports5.
2.3.4. Agent Knowledge of Arguments. Let A be a finite set
of arguments. Each agent 𝑖 has a sack of arguments A𝑖 ⊂
A of size |A𝑖| = 𝑘𝑖 whose content reflects her relative
position, 𝑜𝑖, on P (see Figure 2). For extreme-opinion agents,
a proportion 𝜙𝑒 ≥ 0.5 of the 𝑘 arguments in their sacks are
of the same adherence to the principle than their opinions,
whereas for moderate agents a proportion 𝜙𝑚 ≤ 𝜙𝑒 of
their 𝑘 arguments are of the valence of their opinions. The
hypothesis feeds from results found in [22] stating that “an
individual places a verbal statement on an issue both in terms
of the item’s relative proximity to his own position and the
latitude which is acceptable to him around that focal point of
acceptance.”
The arguments in an agent 𝑖’s sack are those that she
knows how to use and advance in a deliberative interac-
tion. The size of the sack represents agent 𝑖’s ability to
communicate in a deliberative context. It follows that each
agent 𝑖 possesses partial knowledge (𝐾𝑖 ⊂ A × A) of the
attack relation between the arguments in A and of 𝐴𝐹𝜀,
which she derives from the arguments in her sack and
what she observes in deliberation. Knowledge of arguments
is assumed to be “attack-oriented”—an agent 𝑖 knows an
attack (𝑎, 𝑏) ∈ A𝑖 × A if she knows, upon observation,
that neither she nor the group can rationally accept 𝑎
alongside 𝑏. She may be aware of the existing defense relation
among arguments when concatenating the information she
accumulates on their attack relation during deliberation.
She may use this information strategically in deliberative
contexts.
Let 𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑡 : A × A 󳨀→ N be the length of the shortest
path between two elements in the argumentation framework
induced by an agent 𝑖’s knowledge𝐾𝑖. 𝑖 sees an argument 𝑎 as
an attacker (defender) of an argument 𝑏 if𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑡(𝑎, 𝑏) ≡ 1mod 2
(𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑡(𝑎, 𝑏) ≡ 0mod 2). An argument 𝑎 that is at an odd
distance from another argument 𝑏 attacks it since either it
directly attacks the argument or it attacks a defender of the
argument. Likewise, if 𝑎 is at a pair distance of 𝑏, it attacks
an attacker of 𝑏 and thus defends it. If such path does not
exist, then the distance is undefined and the agent does not
see either argument as an attacker or defender of the other.
Further, let AF𝑑 = (A𝑑,R𝑑) denote the current state of
affairs in deliberation. An agent 𝑖’s knowledge ofR is the set
of attacks and defenses she can infer from the arguments she
knows (𝐴𝑡𝑡𝑖,𝐷𝑒𝑓𝑖) and the attacks and defenses she can infer
from deliberation (𝐴𝑡𝑡𝑑𝑖 ,𝐷𝑒𝑓𝑑𝑖 ):
𝐾𝑖 = 𝐴𝑡𝑡𝑖 ∪ 𝐴𝑡𝑡𝑑𝑖 ∪ 𝐷𝑒𝑓𝑖 ∪ 𝐷𝑒𝑓𝑑𝑖 (2)
where,
(i) 𝐴𝑡𝑡𝑖 = {(𝑎, 𝑏) ∈ A𝑖 ×A𝑖 | 𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑡(𝑎, 𝑏) ≡ 1mod 2)};
(ii) 𝐷𝑒𝑓𝑖 = {(𝑎, 𝑏) ∈ A𝑖 ×A𝑖 | 𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑡(𝑎, 𝑏) ≡ 0mod 2};
(iii) 𝐴𝑡𝑡𝑑𝑖 = {(𝑎, 𝑏) ∈ (A𝑖 ∪ A𝑑) × A𝑑 | 𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑡(𝑎, 𝑏) ≡1mod 2)};
(iv) 𝐷𝑒𝑓𝑑𝑖 = {(𝑎, 𝑏) ∈ (A𝑖 ∪ A𝑑) × A𝑑 | 𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑡(𝑎, 𝑏) ≡0mod 2}.
Notice that agents have no restriction on the amount of
information they can carry and use during deliberation. The
model implies that agents have the ability to use and process
all information on the attack relations if they could observe
the attacks and that they all have equally high cognitive
capacity. Agent knowledge resets at the end of each decision-
making process, but argument sacks stay untouched. In other
words, argument sacks are static in the model.
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2.3.5. Agent Behavior during Deliberation. Agents may
behave in twodifferentways in deliberation.Theymay behave
naively or focusedly. Naive agents use deliberation to voice
their opinions on the principle through arguments. Focused
agents strategically argue in favor of proposal arguments that
support the principle they favor. In both cases, agents advance
arguments in terms of the arguments’ relative proximity to
their own positions [22].
Let 𝑎𝑖 ∈ A𝑖 denote the argument an agent advances
in a debate 𝑑 (of a deliberation process 𝐷𝐼) over a central
argument 𝐼 and V𝑎 the valence of an argument 𝑎 ∈ A. Let
(i) 𝑓𝑖(𝑎) ≡ (𝑜𝑖 × V𝑎 > 0 ∨ 𝑜𝑖 = V𝑎 = 0), the formula that
is satisfied if the argument 𝑎 is of the same valence as
the opinion of agent 𝑖;
(ii) 𝑔𝑖(𝑎) ≡ (𝑎, 𝑏 ∈ A𝑖\A𝑑 ∧ ∀𝑏(|𝑜𝑖 − V𝑏| > |𝑜𝑖 − V𝑎|)), the
formula that is satisfied only if the argument 𝑎 is in 𝑖’s
sack (A𝑖) and not in the debate and is the closest, in
terms of adherence to the principle P, to 𝑖’s opinion;
(iii) ℎ𝑖(𝑎) ≡ (𝑓𝑖(𝑎) ∧ 𝑔𝑖(𝑎)) the conjunction of the
preceding formuli indicating that an argument 𝑎 is in
agent 𝑖’s sack and not in the debate, of the same sign
as 𝑜𝑖, and closest to 𝑜𝑖 in absolute value.
Naive agents choose 𝑎𝑖 = 𝑎 such that ℎ𝑖(𝑎) is true given any
proposal argument 𝐼. Agents that behave strategically, or to
say, focusedly, choose their moves in the debate as follows
(𝑁𝐼𝐿 indicates no move or null argument):
(a) if agent 𝑖’s position with respect to P is of the same
sign as the proposal argument’s adherence to P (𝑓𝑖(𝐼)), she
advances an argument 𝑎 such that
(i) ℎ𝑖(𝑎) ∧ ((𝑎, 𝐼) ∈ 𝐷𝑒𝑓𝑑𝑖 )) is true. If 𝑎𝑖 = 𝑁𝐼𝐿,
(i1) ¬ℎ𝑖(𝑎) ∧ 𝑔𝑖(𝑎) ∧ ((𝑎, 𝐼) ∈ 𝐷𝑒𝑓𝑑𝑖 ) (chooses an
argument not of the same sign and closest to her
opinion and defending 𝐼) is true. If 𝑎𝑖 = 𝑁𝐼𝐿,
(ii) ℎ𝑖(𝑎) ∧ ((∃𝑐 ∈ A𝑖)((𝑐, 𝐼) ∈ 𝐴𝑡𝑡𝑑𝑖 ∧ (𝑎, 𝑐) ∈ 𝐴𝑡𝑡𝑖))
(anticipates an attack from an argument 𝑐 on 𝐼 and
advances an argument that attacks the argument 𝑐)6
is true. If 𝑎𝑖 = 𝑁𝐼𝐿,
(ii1) ¬ℎ𝑖(𝑎)∧𝑔𝑖(𝑎)∧ ((∃𝑐 ∈ A𝑖)((𝑐, 𝐼) ∈ 𝐴𝑡𝑡𝑑𝑖 ∧(𝑎, 𝑐) ∈𝐴𝑡𝑡𝑖)) is true. If 𝑎𝑖 = 𝑁𝐼𝐿,
(iii) ℎ𝑖(𝑎) ∧ ((𝑎, 𝐼) ∉ 𝐴𝑡𝑡𝑑𝑖 ) (simply does not attack 𝐼)
is true. If 𝑎𝑖 = 𝑁𝐼𝐿,
(iii1)¬ℎ𝑖(𝑎)∧𝑔𝑖(𝑎)∧((𝑎, 𝐼) ∉ 𝐴𝑡𝑡𝑑𝑖 ) is true. If 𝑎𝑖 = 𝑁𝐼𝐿,
(iv) 𝑎𝑖 = 𝑁𝐼𝐿 (the agent will advance no argument).
(b) if agent 𝑖’s position with respect toP is of the opposite
sign of the proposal argument’s adherence to P (¬𝑓𝑖(𝐼)), she
plays the argument 𝑎 such that
(i) ℎ𝑖(𝑎) ∧ ((𝑎, 𝐼) ∈ 𝐴𝑡𝑡𝑑𝑖 ) 7. If 𝑎𝑖 = 𝑁𝐼𝐿,
(i1) ¬ℎ𝑖(𝑎)∧𝑔𝑖(𝑎)∧ ((𝑎, 𝐼) ∈ 𝐴𝑡𝑡𝑑𝑖 ) is true. If 𝑎𝑖 = 𝑁𝐼𝐿,
(ii) ℎ𝑖(𝑎) ∧ ((∃𝑏 ∈ A𝑖)((𝑏, 𝐼) ∈ 𝐷𝑒𝑓𝑑𝑖 ∧ (𝑎, 𝑏) ∈ 𝐴𝑡𝑡𝑖))
(anticipates a defense from an argument 𝑐 to 𝐼 and
advances an argument that attacks 𝑐) is true. If 𝑎𝑖 =𝑁𝐼𝐿,
(ii1)¬ℎ𝑖(𝑎)∧𝑔𝑖(𝑎)∧((∃𝑏 ∈ A𝑖)((𝑏, 𝐼) ∈ 𝐷𝑒𝑓𝑑𝑖 ∧(𝑎, 𝑏) ∈𝐴𝑡𝑡𝑖)) is true. If 𝑎𝑖 = 𝑁𝐼𝐿,
(iii) ℎ𝑖(𝑎) ∧ ((∀𝑏 ∈ A𝑑)((𝑏, 𝐼) ∈ 𝐴𝑡𝑡𝑑𝑖 ∧ (𝑎, 𝑏) ∉ 𝐴𝑡𝑡𝑑𝑖 ))
(avoids attacking any attacker of 𝐼). If 𝑎𝑖 = 𝑁𝐼𝐿,
(iii1)¬ℎ𝑖(𝑎)∧𝑔𝑖(𝑎)∧((∀𝑏 ∈ A𝑑)((𝑏, 𝐼) ∈ 𝐴𝑡𝑡𝑑𝑖 ∧(𝑎, 𝑏) ∉𝐴𝑡𝑡𝑑𝑖 )). If 𝑎𝑖 = 𝑁𝐼𝐿,
(iv) 𝑎𝑖 = 𝑁𝐼𝐿.
In English, a focused agent that is opposed to the proposal
attempts to either attack it directly or attack an argument that
is defending it, whereas an agent that agrees with the proposal
attempts to either defend it or avoid attacking it altogether.
This behavioral approach is similar to debate protocols in
abstract argumentation but for the fact that agents may
advance arguments that do not result in an “advancement”
of the debate. In our case, the debates stop for other reasons
(see Section 2.4).
Two important points deserve to be highlighted. Firstly,
focused agents with small argument sacks will regularly find
themselves applying rules (𝑖𝑖𝑖) or (𝑖V). In effect, if they do
not have enough arguments to infer attacks and defenses,
their behavior in deliberation is likely to be similar to that of
the naive agents. Secondly, the naive and focused behavioral
assumptions presented here are very different in terms of
computational complexity. The first assumes that the agent
observes the debate but what she sees has no effect on her
course of action; i.e., the argument she voices is uniquely
determined by how she feels about the principle behind
the proposal argument. In the second, an agent debates,
essentially, to knock out any proposal argument she disagrees
with8.
2.4. Tables for Deliberation. Tables are the physical or virtual
places where the exchange of arguments occurs. Agents
deliberate on these tables to determine whether the proposal
argument is acceptable or not and are, thus, subdued by
the deliberation procedure imposed by the table’s central
authority (CA) [27]. The CA decides on the structure and
length of the collective decision-making process and the
deliberation procedure. It controls the percentage of agents
from the population that actively participates in the debate
(𝑛𝐷) and the labeling-based semantics used to extract accept-
able arguments from the framework (𝜎). The percentage 𝑛𝐷
denotes either the proportion of agents in the population that
gets to advance arguments in a population-scale deliberation,
or an independent sample of agents summoned to actively
participate in the debate. 𝜎 stands for the procedure used to
conclude on the epistemic status of the proposal argument
and the arguments advanced during deliberation.
The CA has the ability to stop debates at will using a stop
rule that inherently depends on the number of debates that
ought to take place before a decision is deemed sufficiently
discussed (𝑚), the maximum number of debates that can
take place before abandoning deliberation (𝑚), and the label
given to the proposal argument 𝐼 (𝑠𝑟(𝑚,𝑚,L𝑎𝑏(𝐼))). 𝑠𝑟
is a Boolean function whose value “true” signals the call
for a vote and/or the end of the decision-making process.𝑚 is associated with a minimal dialectical or epistemic
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requirement to consider a proposal for voting and to a lower
bound of the length of the deliberation process; 𝑚 provides
an upper bound. Moreover, the CA controls the size of the
time interval between debates (𝑡𝐷), the collective decision
rule (e.g. if there is voting on the deliberated proposals), and
the majority quota rule for accepting proposal arguments
(𝛼) in the decision-making process. 𝑡𝐷 may represent the
frequency or density of pair-wise interactions in a decision-
making process.
2.4.1. The Construction of a Decision-Making Process. A
deliberation process or debate in ourmodel is a tool to obtain
labels for proposal arguments that are as close as possible to
the ideal or consensual ones. To define a deliberation process
formally, we introduce the notion of debate step as constituent
of a deliberation process. Informally, a debate step is a time
step in which a debate occurs. Formally and more event-
oriented, a debate step (𝑑,𝑁󸀠, 𝐵󸀠, 𝑆󸀠) of a debate 𝐷𝐼 on 𝐼 is
a quadruplet composed of a set of agents 𝑁󸀠 ⊂ 𝑁, a set of
arguments 𝐵󸀠 ⊂ ⋃𝑖∈𝑁󸀠 A𝑖, a set of attack relations 𝑆󸀠 ⊂ R,
and a mapping
𝑑 : (AF; 2A × 2R) 󳨀→ AF
(𝐴𝐹; (𝐵󸀠, 𝑆󸀠)) 󳨃󳨀→ 𝐴𝐹󸀠 = (𝐵 ∪ 𝐵󸀠, 𝑆 ⊔ 𝑆󸀠) (3)
that adds the arguments in 𝐵󸀠 and some attacks in 𝑆󸀠 to a
framework 𝐴𝐹 = (𝐵, 𝑆) and where 𝑆 ⊔ 𝑆󸀠 = {(𝑎, 𝑏) ∈ 𝑆 ∪ 𝑆󸀠 |𝑎, 𝑏 ∈ 𝐵 ∪ 𝐵󸀠}. In the same spirit, we define a deliberation
process𝐷𝐼 on a proposal argument 𝐼 as a sequence of debate
steps (𝑑,𝑁𝑠, 𝐵𝑠, 𝑆𝑠)𝑠>0 such that𝑁0 = 0 and
𝑑((𝑠−1⋃
𝑗=0
𝐵𝑗, 𝑠−1⨆
𝑗=0
𝑆𝑗) ; (𝐵𝑠, 𝑆𝑠)) ⊂ (A,R) , (4)
with
(i) 𝐵0 = 𝐼 (the initial argument is the proposal argu-
ment);
(ii) 𝑆0 = 0 (no reflexive attack from 𝐼 to 𝐼 is allowed);
(iii) (∀𝑠 > 0)(⋃𝑗<𝑠 𝐵𝑗∩𝐵𝑠 = 0) (any newly added argument
to the framework has yet to be added to it);
(iv) (∀𝑠 > 0)(⨆𝑗<𝑠 𝑆𝑗 ∩ 𝑆𝑠 = 0) (any newly considered
attack among arguments cannot be declared among
arguments that are not in the framework);
(v) lim𝑠󳨀→∞(⋃𝑠>0 𝐵𝑠, ⋃𝑠>0 𝑆𝑠) ⊆ (A,R) (the system is
stable; no arguments are created during deliberation).
Finally, let L𝑎𝑏𝑑(𝐼) denote the label given to argument 𝐼 at
a debate step 𝑑 during a deliberation process 𝐷𝐼. A decision-
making process, notedD𝐼 = (𝑛𝐷, 𝑡𝐷, 𝑠𝑟(𝑚,𝑚,L𝑎𝑏𝑑(𝐼)), 𝛼, 𝜎),
over a proposalwhose justification argument is 𝐼 is a sequence
of debate and nondebate steps (𝑧𝑡)𝑡∈N, 𝑧𝑡 ∈ {𝑑, 𝑑}, such that
(i) 𝑑 are debate steps and 𝑑 nondebate steps that corre-
spond to time steps at which there are no debates.
(ii) If 𝑡(mod 𝑡𝐷) ≡ 0, then 𝑧𝑡 = 𝑑, and 𝑑, otherwise;
For Against
Table
CA
in out
out out in
out in
prop.arg
Figure 3: A representation of a table of deliberation between
two groups of 3 agents with 4 arguments each. Each agent has
advanced an argument. Agents tacitly agree on the attacks between
the arguments. The CA determines the labeling using the grounded
labeling-based semantics.
: d d d d d d d d d d d d d
Time: 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12
I
Figure 4: A decision-making processD𝐼 or collective decision step
starting at 𝑡 = 0 composed of debate (𝑑) and nondebate (𝑑) substeps.
Debate steps are shaded. The number of nondebate steps between
debates is 𝑡𝐷 = 3; the number of debates in the decision-making
process is𝑚 = 4.
(iii) The subsequence (𝑧𝑙𝑡)𝑙𝑡∈N of 𝑧𝑡 with 𝑙𝑡 = 𝑡 such that𝑡(mod 𝑡𝐷) ≡ 0 is a deliberation process with |𝑁󸀠| =𝑛𝐷 × |𝑁|;
(iv) 𝑠𝑟(⋅, ⋅,L𝑎𝑏𝑑(𝐼)) pursues the deliberation process as
long asL𝑎𝑏𝑑(𝐼) = 𝑢𝑛𝑑 under the semantics 𝜎;
(v) The length of the sequence |𝑧𝑡|, or, equivalently, the
duration of the process, is somewhere in the interval⟦𝑚𝑡𝐷, 𝑚𝑡𝐷⟧;
(vi) The final labeling for the proposal argument 𝐼,
L𝑎𝑏(𝐼), is determined by a combination of its delib-
erated labelL𝑎𝑏𝑑(𝐼) and a majority vote of majority
quota 𝛼.
A decision-making process ends when a final decision has
been taken concerning the acceptability of the proposal P;
e.g. 𝐼 has been deemed unacceptable (L𝑎𝑏𝑑(𝐼) = 𝑜𝑢𝑡) or a
majority of agents have voted againstP. For a representation
of a deliberative interaction on a table, see Figure 3; for one of
a decision-making process, see Figure 4
Please note that every collective decision can be seen as
a “time step” in as much as it describes how agents update
opinions and make collective decisions. In the model, the
decision-making process and the parameters define the sub-
steps or events that occur within the time step. Henceforth,
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Fix procedurals:
m, m, α, nD , tD , σ .
Init. count m ← 0
Given proposal , an
argument I is randomly generated.
nD × |N | agents are
randomly picked.
m ← m + 1
Begin decision process
on proposal 
at time t.
t ← t + 1
Deliberation step m
← 0
t ← t + 1
dyadic opinion
update Eq. (5).
tm ← tm + 1
m ≥ m?
tm > tD ?
ℒd (I) = in?
m ≥ m?
yields ℒ(I).
ℒ(I) = in? Deliberationupdate Eq. (6).
End decision
yes
no
no
no
yes
yes
no
yes
yes
yes
no
no
I
Vote on ℒd(I)
ℒd (I) = und?
ＪＬＩ＝？ＭＭ I.
Init. count tm
yields ℒd(I).
Figure 5: Process chart for a decision processD𝐼 on a proposalP. 𝑡 corresponds to time, and 𝑚 (𝑡𝑚) corresponds to the number of debate
(non-debate) steps that have taken place in the deliberation process (in between two debate steps) over time for the mixed discussion model.
We useL𝑎𝑏(𝐼) andL(𝐼) interchangeably in the figure for presentation.
comparing simulations on the basis of the different decision-
making processes translates into comparing these collective
decision steps.
2.4.2. Deliberation Protocol. To define the deliberation proto-
col held in the table, either as a consequence of the definition
process or as a statement, we assume the following:
(i) Agents may decide not to contribute to the debate.
(ii) All agents have the same probability, conditional to
their opinions, of being picked to participate in a
debate or deliberation step.
(iii) There is no restriction on the number of times each
agent can participate in a deliberation process.
(iv) Each agent may only place one argument per debate
step.
(v) Arguments that have already been advanced in the
debate may attack newly placed arguments9.
The deliberation or debate protocol goes as follows:
(1) The CA randomly generates and makes public a
central argument or proposal argument 𝐼 and informs
all agents about the rules of the decision-making
process.
(2) The CA randomly draws two sets of (𝑛𝐷 × |𝑁|)/2
agents with divergent views10 onP and P. It merges
them to create the set of debaters𝑁󸀠.
(3) Each agent 𝑖 advances an argument from her sack
A𝑖. The CA makes sure that there are no repeating
arguments (agents already take argument repetition
into account).
(4) The CA establishes the debate step 𝑑’s argumentation
framework and computes its labeling,L𝜎𝑑(A𝑑), using𝜎.
(5) If the computed label for 𝐼 is L𝑎𝑏𝑑(𝐼) = 𝑢𝑛𝑑
or the number of debates steps is inferior or equal
to 𝑚 at time 𝑡, then the CA stops the debate and
resumes it at the (𝑡 + 𝑡𝐷 + 1)’th time step, by repeating(1), (2), (3), (4), and (5).
(6) Let L𝑎𝑏(𝐼) be the final label given to the proposal
argument 𝐼. If voting is allowed, then if more than𝛼 × |𝑁| agents agree with 𝐼, 𝐼 is accepted (L𝑎𝑏(𝐼) =
𝑖𝑛), it is rejected if strictly less than 𝛼× |𝑁| agree with
it (L𝑎𝑏(𝐼) = 𝑜𝑢𝑡). When there is a tie, ifL𝑎𝑏𝑑(𝐼) =
𝑢𝑛𝑑, then L𝑎𝑏(𝐼) = 𝑜𝑢𝑡; if L𝑎𝑏𝑑(𝐼) = 𝑖𝑛, then
L𝑎𝑏(𝐼) = 𝑖𝑛. When voting is not part of the decision-
making process (𝛼 = 0),L𝑎𝑏𝑑(𝐼) =L𝑎𝑏(𝐼).
One important point to notice about this protocol is that it
induces a stop rule, 𝑠𝑟 (cf. steps (5) and (6) of protocol) for
the decision process and, thus, it always ends. Either agents
debate and agree on the proposal’s acceptability through
argumentation or, after 𝑚 debate steps, they directly vote
on it so that a decision concerning the proposal is always
reached. Refer to Figure 5 for a sweeping description of the
deliberation protocol and the decision-making process.
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Figure 6: A dyadic interaction between agents 𝑖 and 𝑗 as expressed
in (5). Agent 𝑖’s opinion falls within agent 𝑗’s latitude of noncommit-
ment and conversely. Neither agent affects the opinion of the other.
2.5. Opinion Dynamics for Social Interactions. In this subsec-
tion, we describe the opinion diffusion model based on pair-
wise interactions among agents and deliberation. Sherif ’s
and Hovland’s social judgment theory [22] motivates part of
our approach. It describes how individuals’ opinions change
on the basis of their attitude structures. Attitude structures
refer to the relative scope, width, or latitude of categories
used by individuals when evaluating information, namely,
the latitudes of acceptance, rejection, and noncommitment
[32]. The idea behind this theory is that individuals change
their positions only in accordance to how far or close the
communicative cues they receive are from (to) their anchor
positions. It holds that if communicative cues are far (close)
from (to) an agent’s position, say over her latitude of rejection
(acceptance), then the agent shifts her position away from
(towards) the position defended by the cues. In the casewhere
the cues fall within the agent’s latitude of noncommitment,
her position does not change (see Figure 6 and Equation (5)).
2.5.1. Pair-Wise or Dyadic Opinion Dynamics. As agents
may communicate and deliberate collectively, they may also
engage in one-to-one conversations with other agents to
ponder on their positions. We loosely associate this type of
communication with dyadic nonargumentative exchange or
discussion based on fallacious arguments and persuasion.
In the light of social judgment theory and the description
of agents in the system, we model pair-wise symmetric
interactions following the opinion dynamicsmodel in [9]. An
agent 𝑗’s influence on an agent 𝑖’s opinion at time 𝑡 is governed
by the ensuing difference equation:
𝑜𝑡+1𝑖 =
{{{{{{{{{
𝑜𝑡𝑖 + 𝜇𝑖 (𝑜𝑡𝑗 − 𝑜𝑡𝑖) 𝑖𝑓 󵄨󵄨󵄨󵄨󵄨𝑜𝑡𝑖 − 𝑜𝑡𝑗󵄨󵄨󵄨󵄨󵄨 < 𝑈𝑖𝑜𝑡𝑖 − 𝜇𝑖 (𝑜𝑡𝑗 − 𝑜𝑡𝑖) 𝑖𝑓 󵄨󵄨󵄨󵄨𝑜𝑡𝑖 − 𝑜𝑡𝑖 󵄨󵄨󵄨󵄨 > 𝑇𝑖𝑜𝑡𝑖 𝑜𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑤𝑖𝑠𝑒
(5)
where the parameter 𝜇𝑖 ∈ [0, 0.5] controls for the strength
of the attraction and repulsion in social influence and 𝑇𝑖
and 𝑈𝑖 are the latitudes of rejection and acceptance for agent𝑖, respectively. The parameter 𝜇𝑖 may be thought of as the
relative importance agent 𝑖 gives to the opinions of her peers,
or, analogously, the weight she gives to her own opinion
when updating. 𝜇 < 0.5 means that agents will never give
more weight to the opinions of other agents than to their
own (egocentric bias). When two agents 𝑖 and 𝑗 discuss, if,
for instance, 𝑗 advances an informational cue (argument,
persuasion tactic) and it happens to be close enough to𝑖’s opinion anchor, then 𝑖 shifts her opinion towards the
direction of 𝑗’s informational cue. The symmetric influence
from agent 𝑖 to agent 𝑗 takes effect in the same way (see
Figure 6).
We add to the dyadic dynamics a rule of encounters: at
each step of pair-wise interactions, each agent meets exactly
one other agent at random. This rule may be associated with
random day-to-day encounters among agents. Steps of social
influence correspond to nondebate steps (𝑑) in decision-
making processes.
2.5.2. Deliberative Opinion Dynamics. We define an opinion
update equation that links the proposal arguments that are
advanced during deliberation and opinions. We combine the
uncertain and probabilistic nature of the effect of delibera-
tion, have it a moderating [15, 16] or polarizing [14] one, with
a mechanism similar to the one in social judgment theory
based on the distance between different informational cues
and opinion anchors [32]. The probabilistic modeling of the
opinion update can be related to deliberation encouraging
open-mindedness11 during collective discussion [18]. From
this choice, it follows that deliberated cues can affect even the
most extreme of agents, as opposed to some classic opinion
diffusion models (e.g. [5, 8]) where once agents become
extremists they may no longer become moderate.
LetP be a proposal, V𝑡𝐼 the proposal argument 𝐼’s level of
support for a principle P, and 𝑜𝑡𝑖 an agent 𝑖’s opinion at time𝑡. Then, given the difference 𝛿𝑡𝑖 = (V𝑡𝐼 − 𝑜𝑡𝑖)/2, we define 𝑖’s
probability of being attracted to a decision’s informational cue𝐼 by 𝑥𝑡𝑖 = 𝑝|𝛿𝑡𝑖 |𝑎 , where 𝑝𝑎 denotes a general probability param-
eter that characterizes how important deliberated results are
for the group. The parameter may also be interpreted as
the group’s tendency to be swayed by a decisional majority.
Similarly, we define 𝑖’s probability of being repulsed from a
decision informational cue 𝐼 by 𝑦𝑡𝑖 = 𝑝1/|𝛿𝑡𝑖 |𝑟 , where 𝑝𝑟 denotes
a general probability parameter that characterizes the group’s
dislike of deliberated results. 𝑝𝑟 can also be thought of as the
group’s distrust of the system symbolized by deliberation and
democracy.
Let L𝑎𝑏(𝐼) denote the epistemic status of the proposal
argument 𝐼 at the end of a decision process over P; every
agent 𝑖 updates her opinion as follows:
(i) IfL𝑎𝑏(𝐼) = 𝑖𝑛:
𝑜𝑡+1𝑖 =
{{{{{{{{{
𝑜𝑡𝑖 + 2𝛾𝑖𝛿𝑡𝑖 𝑤𝑖𝑡ℎ 𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑏𝑎𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦 𝑥𝑡𝑖
𝑜𝑡𝑖 − 2𝛾𝑖𝛿t𝑖 𝑤𝑖𝑡ℎ 𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑏𝑎𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦 𝑦𝑡𝑖
𝑜𝑡𝑖 𝑤𝑖𝑡ℎ 𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑏𝑎𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦 1 − 𝑥𝑡𝑖 − 𝑦𝑡𝑖
(6)
(ii) IfL𝑎𝑏(𝐼) = 𝑜𝑢𝑡: 𝑜𝑡+1𝑖 = 𝑜𝑡𝑖
where 𝛾𝑖 ∈ [0, 0.5] is the strength of repulsion and attraction
in the dynamic.Themeaning of 𝛾𝑖 is analogous to the one of𝜇𝑖
in the dyadic interactionsmodel but for the observation that 𝑖
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weights her opinion to an argument rather than to an opinion.
The interpretation of this dynamics is straightforward. If
the deliberated proposal argument is close to an agent’s
opinion, then it is very likely that the agent shifts its opinion
towards it. Please note that the probability 𝑥𝑡𝑖 (𝑦𝑡𝑖 ) that an
agent is attracted (repelled) to (from) an accepted deliberated
proposal argument is bounded below (above) by 𝑝𝑎 (𝑝𝑟)
(equivalently, 𝑥𝑡𝑖 ∈ [𝑝𝑎, 1]; 𝑦𝑡𝑖 ∈ [0, 𝑝𝑟]). Steps of deliberative
opinion dynamics are associated with debate steps in which a
concluding collective decision is made.
2.5.3. Mixed Opinion Dynamics. Opinion dynamics in the
context of decision-making processes can be best described as
a combination of the two preceding dynamics. In this opinion
dynamics model, agents are engaged in a democratic system
in which they deliberate, vote for proposals, and occasionally
discuss with one another on the principle supported by the
proposals.The opinion dynamics for an agent 𝑖 can be written
as a sequence of dyadic and deliberative opinion updates:
𝑜𝑡+1𝑖 =
{{{{{{{{{
𝐸𝑞𝑢𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 (5) 𝑖𝑓 𝑡 ≡ 0 (𝑚𝑜𝑑𝑡𝐷) ∧ 𝑠𝑟 (⋅) = 𝑓𝑎𝑙𝑠𝑒
𝐸𝑞𝑢𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 (6) 𝑖𝑓 𝑡 ≡ 0 (𝑚𝑜𝑑𝑡𝐷) ∧ 𝑠𝑟 (⋅) = 𝑡𝑟𝑢𝑒
𝑜𝑡𝑖 𝑜𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑤𝑖𝑠𝑒
(7)
where 𝑠𝑟(⋅) is the decision process’s stop rule, 𝑡𝐷 the number
of time steps between each deliberation step, Equation (5)
describes the dynamics for the dyadic interactions, and Equa-
tion (6) posits the changes in opinions due to the deliberated
cues. Equation (5) applies when agents are not deliberating
and when each agent encounters another agent to exchange
information that may lead to local opinion updates. When
there is deliberation, a handful of agents deliberate and, if
they reach the stop condition imposed by the table, all agents
vote for the proposal. They update (see Equation (6)) their
opinions on the basis of the proposal argument’s support for
the principle and the result of the scrutiny. Otherwise, there
is no change in the opinions of the agents. A vote indicates
the end of the decision-making process.
3. Experiments and Calibration
In this section, we introduce the metrics that enable us to
observe the simulations and characterize the calibration of
the model.
3.1. Observations and Initialization. In this section we
describe the simulations and the protocol used to test and
observe the results of our model. We introduce the metrics
of interest, explain the calibration of the model, describe
some results obtained from the simulation data used for
calibration, and conclude with a brief discussion on the
expected outcomes of the mixed opinion dynamics model.
3.1.1. Metrics or Statistics of Interest. Let 𝑆 denote the end of
a simulation. We are interested in the effect of deliberation
and of the model’s procedural parameters on the following
metrics or statistics:
(i) Variance of opinions (𝑉𝑎𝑟(𝑜)): the variance of
opinions at time 𝑆. Since opinions live in the union
of the positive and negative unit intervals, 𝑉𝑎𝑟(𝑜) ∈[0, 1]. The higher the variance of the distribution is,
the more “diverse” the opinions are.
(ii) Proportion of extremists in the population
(𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑝𝑒𝑥): the proportion of agents in the population
with opinions such that |𝑜𝑖| ≥ 0.75. A high proportion
of extremists makes “healthy” consensus12 difficult to
reach and deliberation more or less informative.
(iii) Shifts of opinions (𝑆ℎ) [33]: statistic that measures
the aggregated change in individual opinion at time 𝑆
with respect to aggregated individual opinion at the
beginning of the simulation,
𝑆ℎ = 2∑𝑖∈𝑁 󵄨󵄨󵄨󵄨𝑜0,𝑖 − 𝑜𝑆,𝑖󵄨󵄨󵄨󵄨
max𝑖∈𝑁𝑜0,𝑖 −min𝑖∈𝑁𝑜0,𝑖 . (8)
𝑆ℎ is positive and bounded above by 2|𝑁| since 𝑜𝑖 ∈[−1, 1]. A low shift statistic implies that the process
has a small impact on opinions.
(iv) Judgment or consensual inaccuracy (𝑒𝑐): consen-
sual accuracy of a group consists of an ad hoc statistic
measuring a group’s ability to infer correct labels for
proposal arguments from a decision-making process,
given the ideal consensual labeling based on full-
information,L𝜎𝜀 (A). We use a Hamming-based dis-
tance on labelings [34] to define the statistic,
𝑒𝑐 = 1|I| ∑𝐼∈I𝑎𝐼
󵄨󵄨󵄨󵄨L𝑎𝑏𝜀 (𝐼) ̸=L𝑎𝑏 (𝐼)󵄨󵄨󵄨󵄨 , (9)
whereI is the set of all discussed proposal arguments
and 𝑎𝐼 = 1/2 ifL𝑎𝑏𝜀(𝐼) = 𝑢𝑛𝑑 or ifL𝑎𝑏(𝐼) = 𝑢𝑛𝑑,𝑎𝐼 = 1 otherwise.𝑒𝑐 lives in the interval [0, 1]. An inaccuracy statistic
close to 1 indicates that agents, subdued to a particular
decision-making process, make many mistakes in
judging the labels of the proposal arguments. Note
that, when there is voting, all proposal arguments are
labeled either 𝑖𝑛 or 𝑜𝑢𝑡 after deliberation.
(v) Coherence (𝑖𝑟): letL𝑎𝑏𝐷(𝐼) be the label obtained
for 𝐼 from the deliberation process without voting.
The coherence statistic measures how well voting
results adjust to results obtained during deliberation
only. We use the proportion of arguments that have
been labeled 𝑖𝑛 in the debate and that agents have
voted favorably for,
𝑖𝑟 = 󵄨󵄨󵄨󵄨{𝐼 ∈ I |L𝑎𝑏𝐷 (𝐼) = 𝑖𝑛 ∧L𝑎𝑏 (𝐼) = 𝑖𝑛}󵄨󵄨󵄨󵄨󵄨󵄨󵄨󵄨{𝐼 ∈ I |L𝑎𝑏𝐷 (𝐼) = 𝑖𝑛}󵄨󵄨󵄨󵄨 . (10)
The coherence statistic’s domain is [0, 1]. If after 𝑀
debates no deliberated central argument has been
labeled 𝑖𝑛 or voting is not part of the procedure of
collective decision-making, then the statistic equals
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1 or, said differently, agents are perfectly coherent.
This comes for the fact that if the central argument
is labeled 𝑜𝑢𝑡, then it is not even eligible for voting; if
labeled 𝑢𝑛𝑑, then the debate will always be coherent
with the preferences of the agents since the result will
be a simple aggregation of their votes. If the statistic
equals 0, then none of the proposal arguments labeled
𝑖𝑛 are voted in favorably by the agents. It follows that a
high coherence statistic implies that when agents vote
for acceptable proposal arguments, the results of the
scrutiny reflect the consensual rationality expressed
in the deliberation process.
3.1.2. Parameters of Interest. We recall the parameters of
interest in our study that are linked to the structure of the
decision-making processes:
(i) 𝑚: the minimum number of time steps in which a
debate or a scrutiny occurs in a decision-making pro-
cess before a final deliberated decision is submitted to
a vote;
(ii) 𝑛𝐷: the number of agents that deliberate, as a propor-
tion of the population;
(iii) 𝑡𝐷: the number of time steps between debates in
which pair-wise interactions among agents may
occur;
(iv) 𝛼: the proportional majority requirement for the
acceptance of a proposal. When 𝛼 = 0, it stands for
no voting: “any proposal argument that is labeled 𝑖𝑛
during deliberation is accepted.”
Please recall that, in terms of the definition of a decision-
making process, each parameter controls either the length or
the content of the sequence D𝐼 (𝑡𝐷, 𝑚) or the rules that are
applied during the debate steps (𝛼, 𝑛𝐷) (refer to Figure 4).
3.1.3. Initialization. All |𝑁| = 400 agents start off with an
opinion 𝑜𝑖 drawn from a uniform distribution U(−1, 1) 13.
Given 𝑜𝑖, every agent 𝑖 randomly draws a setA𝑖 (|A𝑖| = 𝑘) of
arguments from a balanced14 argument pool A of𝑀 = 600
nonneutral (V𝑎 ̸= 0) arguments on the basis of 𝑜𝑖: if |𝑜𝑖| < 0.25
(the opinion is moderate), then agent 𝑖 randomly fills half
of her argument sack with arguments such that V𝑎 < 0 and
the other half with arguments such that V𝑎 > 0 (𝜙𝑚𝑖 = 0.5).
Otherwise, she randomly fills 𝜙𝑒𝑖 ≥ 0.5 of her sack with
arguments such that V𝑎 and 𝑜𝑖 are of the same sign and the
remaining (1 − 𝜙𝑒𝑖 ) with arguments of the opposite sign15.
Like for the opinion of agents, every argument 𝑎’s
adherence to the principle P, V𝑎, is drawn from a uniform
distribution U(−1, 1). The attack relation that gives birth to
the ideal argumentation framework (𝐴𝐹𝜀) is established on
the basis of the V𝑎’s and the arguments’ epistemic reach, 𝑒𝑟.
Let 𝜃(𝑎, 𝑏, 𝑟) = (|V𝑎 + V𝑏|/2)𝑟 be an auxiliary positive
real-valued function that takes two arguments (𝑎, 𝑏) and a
positive real number (𝑟 > 0) as input.The probability that any
argument 𝑎 ∈ A creates a link to any other argument 𝑏 ∈ A
is given by the equation 𝑝 = 𝑝𝜃(𝑎,𝑏,2)𝑒 , and, thus, arguments
supporting opposing views of the principle always attack each
other. We fix 𝑝𝑒, the epistemic correlation parameter, to 0.15.
If 𝑝𝑒 was greater than 0.15, then arguments of the same sign
would attack each other too often (and focused agents would
be rarely incited to advance favorable arguments during
deliberation). If 𝑝𝑒 was lower, then the arguments of the
same type would induce an almost empty graph, which is
unrealistic. The number of arguments that any argument 𝑎
can attack is bounded by 𝑎’s epistemic reach that we fix to
15. A higher value of epistemic reach makes the argument
lattice too conflicting and nearly bipartite. A lower epistemic
reachmakes the lattice not sufficiently conflicting in the sense
that too many arguments can attack the proposal argument
relatively to the few that can defend it. If any argument attacks
the proposal argument, the chances that another argument
attacks the attacker are low. Hence, the proposal argument
is almost never accepted and deliberative opinion updates
become rare.
The arguments in the resulting argumentation frame-
work, 𝐴𝐹𝜀, are given a permanent labeling,L𝜎𝜀 (A) (in short
L𝜀), using𝜎 = grounded semantics.We choose the grounded
labeling-based semantics because it provides a unique admis-
sible labeling, respects minimal rationality constraints while
simplifying the model, and models a skeptic approach to
accepting arguments (see [23, 25, 31]), as it maximizes the
cardinality of the set 𝑢𝑛𝑑 L𝜀. To some extent, if we consider
proposals as committing because they may guide collective
action, choosing a skeptic semantics seems reasonable insofar
as it labels an argument 𝑖𝑛 or 𝑜𝑢𝑡 only if it has no reason
to label it 𝑢𝑛𝑑. For instance, if a proposal is a public policy
that requires large amounts of resources and engages to
future course of action, then it may also determine policy
cycles and heavily burden a group and its future decisions.
In important situations like these, it seems reasonable to
lengthen deliberative cues and ask for more demanding and
“grounded” criteria for policy argument acceptability.
On the proposal’s side, we create an argument 𝐼 whose
adherence to P is also drawn from aU(−1, 1), and we label it
L𝑎𝑏(𝐼) = 𝑢𝑛𝑑. 𝐼 is interpreted as being the main argument
justifying the discussed proposal P and V𝑡𝐼 as its support
for P at time 𝑡. 𝐼 cannot attack other arguments but other
arguments can attack it. For each argument 𝑎 ∈ A, a directed
arc or attack from 𝑎 to 𝐼 is activated with probability 𝑝𝑝 =0.03𝜃(𝑎,𝐼,0.2). When 𝑝𝑝’s lower bound is too high, the proposal
argument is almost always defeated and, thus, deliberative
opinion updates do not happen. When 𝑝𝑝’s lower bound
is lower than 0.03, then the opposite occurs—the proposal
argument is always accepted due to an absence of attacks
towards it. Finally, we set the maximum number of debates
to𝑚 = 7 for the decision-making processes stop rules16.
3.2. Calibration and Simulation Protocol. In this subsection,
we discuss the calibration of the models, the termination
conditions for runs in the deliberative and mixed model, and
the expected outcomes in terms of the observations.
3.2.1. Calibrating Dyadic Opinion Dynamics. Dyadic opinion
dynamics correspond to a space of parameters in which
argumentation and deliberation spaces are not taken into
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Table 1: Parameters and parameter types and their domains used to compare dyadic, collective, and mixed opinion dynamics.
Length ofD𝐼 Decisional in𝐷𝐼 Social influence Deliberation influence Cognitive𝑡𝐷 𝑚 𝑚 𝑛𝐷 𝛼 𝜇 𝑇 𝑈 𝑝𝑎 𝑝𝑟 𝛾 𝑘 𝐵𝑒ℎ𝑎V𝑖𝑜𝑟{1, 3, 6} {1, 3, 6} {7} {0.01, 0.02, 0.05} {0, 0.5, 0.66} {0.1} {1.4, 1.8} {0.2, 0.6} {0.3, 0.5} {0.1} {0.05, 0.1, 0.2} {4, 8, 16} {𝑁𝑎𝑖V𝑒, 𝐹𝑜𝑐𝑢𝑠𝑒𝑑}
account. Deliberated arguments and informational cues have
no effect on agent opinion, but agents still vote for the
proposal argument17. We use and calibrate this model for
comparability in terms of all our metrics since they are
not explicitly observed in [9], a reference opinion dynamics
model. Furthermore, for simplicity and comparability again,
we suppose that agents are homogeneous in terms of their
attitude structures and opinion weightings. We fix 𝜇𝑖 =𝜇, 𝑇𝑖 = 𝑇, and 𝑈𝑖 = 𝑈 for all 𝑖 ∈ 𝑁 and for some triplet(𝜇, 𝑈, 𝑇) ∈ [0, 0.5] × [0, 2] × [𝑈, 2].
Experiments suggest that the strength of the dyadic inter-
actions is an explanatory factor of the time of convergence
(𝜇 < 0.5) and of the dyamics’ steady states. Bigger values of 𝜇
speed up convergence towards a stable set of opinion clusters
and affect the size and the relative position of these clusters
in the opinion distribution. 𝜇, however, does not play a major
role in the number of opinion clusters observed at the steady
state of the dynamics.
We set 𝜇 to the value given to it in Jagger et al.’s opinion
dynamics model (𝜇 = 0.1) [9]. For one, it is the smallest
real number for which most results found in [9] hold and the
dynamics are smooth; secondly, it seems to be a reasonable
“strength” of influence considering that we would not want
pair-wise social interactions to completely shadow or mask
an eventual effect of deliberation in the opinion dynamics.
For different values of attitude structures, 𝑇 and 𝑈, we
get exactly the same results as in [9] in terms of the number
and density of the opinion clusters. The different couples
of values of 𝑈 and 𝑇 model the size of the latitude of
noncommitment (𝑇 − 𝑈) and, thus, the agents’ propensity
to update opinions. Whenever 𝑇 − 𝑈 ≤ 0.2, regularities
in convergence and opinion clustering appear. If 𝑈 > 1,
there is always central convergence; if 𝑇 < 1, there is always
bipolar convergence with clusters of similar sizes. For 𝑇 −𝑈 > 0.2, relatively low values of 𝑇 (𝑇 < 1) and relatively
high values of 𝑈 always yield extreme bipolar convergence
with a relatively small cluster of moderate agents (bipolar-
central convergence). For 𝑇 sufficiently high (𝑇 ≥ 1.2) and𝑈 sufficiently low (𝑈 ≤ 0.8), in other words not very ego-
involved agents, there is a bigger spectrum of steady states.
For this reason, we studied the metrics of interest for these
value differences and kept the couples of (𝑈, 𝑇) depicted in
Table 1. For these couples, central, bipolar, bipolar-central
convergence (3 clusters), and multicluster convergence (4 or
5 clusters) are possible and result frommeaningfully different
attitude structures. Judgment accuracy varies significantly
across the four different attitude structures we retain and so
it happens with the variance of opinions. These scenarios
provides us with reference results from which to build upon.
3.2.2. Calibrating Deliberative Social Interactions. Delibera-
tive social interactions correspond to social situations in
which individuals are not influenced by pair-wise discussion
with peers but are sensitive to collectively deliberated infor-
mational cues. On these terms, parameters such as the size
of agents’ argument sacks (𝑘𝑖), the distribution of arguments
in them (𝜙𝑖), the minimum number of debates (𝑚), and
the proportion of debaters from the population (𝑛𝐷) are no
longer mute. We assume, for simplicity, that the formula∃𝜙𝑒∃𝑘∀𝑖(𝑘𝑖 = 𝑘 ∧ 𝜙𝑒𝑖 = 𝜙𝑒 ∧ 𝜙𝑚𝑖 = 0.5) is true with 𝑖 ∈ 𝑁,
for some value 𝜙𝑒 ∈ [0.5, 1], and for 𝑘 ∈ N.
The chosen domains for these parameters (see Table 1)
are justified by the size of the population and the size of the
argument pool (𝑀 = 600) which we set from the start. If 𝑘
is too big (𝑘 ≥ 32) and/or too many agents are allowed in
the debate (𝑛𝐷 ≥ 0.2), then individuals always disprove the
central argument and deliberation is never or rarely taken
into account in the update of opinions. Similar effects occur
when 𝑚 is high, yet we only calibrate it with respect to the
mean running time of a simulation and the values of 𝑡𝐷.
Different distributions of 𝜙𝑒𝑖 seem to significantly or directly
explain none of the statistics we analyze, so we conveniently
set 𝜙𝑒𝑖 = 0.75. We chose the parameter 𝑘 to be always divisible
by 4, for it is convenient given the initial conditions regarding
the argument distribution in the agents’ argument sacks.
We fix the value space for the parameters 𝛾, 𝑝𝑎, 𝑝𝑟 as in
Table 1 to account for different intensities of the effect of
deliberative voting retroaction on the system. For example,
the scenarios where the three parameters are at their lowest
values correspond to the scenarios with the smallest fixed
prior effect of deliberation in the model. Increasing any of
these parameters should, mechanically, be associated with
a world in which agents are more sensitive to collective
decisions. The values for 𝑝𝑎 are taken from [13], where
the author states that, by means of deliberation, 7% to
28% of individuals changed their opinion from agreeing
to disagreeing or vice versa on a referendum question for
Denmark’s participation in the Euro.We choose two different
values for 𝑝𝑎 that account for high (0.3) and very high (0.5)
sensitivity to deliberation in a group. 𝑝𝑟, on the other hand,
is taken to be small (equal to 0.1), since we believe that there
exist agents that will always go against the reached consensus.
Their numbers are meager.
For simplicity, we assume that, for all 𝑖 ∈ 𝑁, 𝛾𝑖 = 𝛾 for
some 𝛾 ∈ [0, 0.5]. In effect, we posit that the heterogeneity
of agents in the deliberative context only derives from their
arguments and their opinions. We decide to calibrate 𝛾 in
allusion to the strength of the social dynamics in pair-wise
interactions. In doing so, we limit ourselves to consider three
different scenarios in which deliberation has, respectively,
half, equal, and twice as much opinion-shifting power than
one-to-one social influence. Finally, we include the accept-
ability voting quota rule 𝛼 whose domain is inspired from
classical majority rules [35] observed empirically (Table 1).
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Table 2: Parameters and their domains used to study the effect of the procedural parameters on the metrics.
Procedural parameters Other parameters𝑡𝐷 𝑚 𝑛𝐷 𝛼 𝑚 𝜇 𝑇 𝑈 𝑝𝑎 𝑝𝑟 𝛾 𝑘 𝐵𝑒ℎ𝑎V𝑖𝑜𝑟{1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6} {1, 2, 3, 4, 5} {0.01, 0.02, 0.03, 0.04, 0.05} {0, 0.5, 0.66} {7} {0.1} {1.6} {0.2} {0.3} {0.05} {0.2} {12} {𝑁𝑎𝑖V𝑒, 𝐹𝑜𝑐𝑢𝑠𝑒𝑑}
3.2.3. Calibrating the Mixed Social Interactions Model. The
mixed interaction model ascribes to a parameter space in
which the effect of collective choices on our metrics is
nontrivial and where deliberation and voting on proposals
determine their acceptability. Since the mixed model is
equivalent to periodic iterations of pair-wise and collective
social interactions, the calibration of the parameters in both
preceding models holds (see Table 1 for the calibration).
The first reason for this is comparability; the second is that
the previous calibration takes into account the fact that
both dynamics are going to be combined. We include the
frequency of debates by adding the parameter 𝑡𝐷 which
controls for the amount of pair-wise interaction among
agents between two distinct deliberation steps.
3.2.4. Termination Conditions for Runs. Simulations stop
once 100 proposals are deliberated on and/or voted for, in
other words, after 100 collective decision steps have occured.
The number of proposals discussed seems arbitrary, yet it is
high enough to observe the effects of deliberation on opinion
distributions and on other metrics related to coherence and
judgment accuracy. We choose the number of runs as a
function of our research questions, which give relevance to
the procedural parameters in the mixed model rather than to
the parameters set to describe the population and its behavior.
3.2.5. Expected Outcomes of the Simulations. We expect more
deliberation, in terms of higher 𝑚 and 𝑛𝐷, to increase
judgment accuracy and, at the same time, to reduce the
variance of opinions. In turn, a smaller variance of opinions
implies that the argument pool for deliberation is smaller and,
therefore, judgment accuracy should be lower. Moreover,
variance increasing dyadic interactions (or rejection) should
also increase judgment accuracy and coherence since bipo-
larization and dissensus foster argument diversity in delibera-
tion.The coherence statistic should be stronger in simulations
in which central convergence appears quickly and agents
are naive. Attitude structures, sensitivity to informational
cues, and weights given to deliberated cues that makes paths
to bipolar convergence smaller or to central convergence
longer should be associated with higher judgment accuracy.
Shifts of opinion should be more visible in scenarios in
which extreme agents are pulled away from the extremes.
Hence, the sensitivity to deliberated cues (𝑝𝑎, 𝑝𝑟) and 𝛾
should explain the shifts. When crossed with high values of𝑈 and 𝑇, the shifting power of deliberation should be at its
highest.
In the end, we do not know how these mechanisms
will play out. The results of the subsequent experiments
give us insight on the interplay between the aforementioned
effects.
4. Results
Before pointing at any result obtained from the mixed
interactions model, we describe and compare the dyadic
and deliberative interactions models in the parameter space
obtained from the calibration in Section 3 (see Table 1).
Primarily, we require our results to describe two orthogonal
types of opinion dynamics: the pair-wise dyadic and the
deliberative. The latter comprises scenarios in which indi-
viduals do not influence each other by means of pair-wise
discussion and only update their opinions from delibera-
tion; the former scenarios where only pair-wise interactions
among agents determine the dynamics. We describe both on
the parameter space given in Table 1 by performing at least
20 simulations per scenario. Quantitative results from the
pair-wise interaction model alone are described during the
calibration and are not treated here—deliberative parameters
have no effect on it. Moreover, we show how these different
model specifications yield qualitatively different opinion
distributions and compare them on the basis of the metrics
of interest. To this end, we perform independent two-sample
Student’s t-tests18 or Welch t-tests19 and compute confidence
intervals at a 0.95 level of confidence. Last but not least, we
comment ordinary least squares (OLS) regression estimates
to account for the direction and magnitude20 of the effects
of the parameters on the metrics. Estimates are declared
significant at a 5% level of risk.
We perform the same analysis on the mixed interactions
model, as we compare it to the pair-wise dyadic and deliber-
ative interactions models and discuss the marginal effects of
the parameters on the metrics. More precisely, we obtain two
different types of results for the mixed interactions model:
the first compares the mixed scenarios to their monolithic
counterparts with respect to each metric and with respect to
the regression estimates; the second gives a clear idea of the
marginal effect of each governance parameter (or parameter
of interest) on our observations. In the first, we allow control
and procedural parameters to vary on a parameter space
similar to those of the dyadic and deliberative opinion
dynamics (see Table 1). In the second, we fix all of our
control parameters, execute 36,000 balanced21 runs, and
focus only on the one-way, pooled effects of our procedural
and behavioral (all agents are focused or naive) parameters.
We generate comprehensive graphs and tables to account for
the obtained results.
Please notice the slight change in the size of the parameter
space for the procedural parameters and in the values of
the nonprocedural ones for the first and second type of
results (refer to Tables 1 and 2, respectively). Since we want
to have a finer idea of the marginal effects of each of the
procedural parameters on how well a group decides on
proposals, we make the value jumps for each parameter (1)
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(；) (U, T) = (0.2, 1.8) (b) (, pa, , m, nD) = (0.05, 0.5, 0.0, 2, 0.2) (＝) ０；Ｌ；Ｇ？Ｎ？ＬＭ ＣＨ (＜) , (＝) , ；Ｈ＞ tD = 3
(d) (５, ４) = (0.2, 1.4) (e) (, pa, , m, nD) = (0.1, 0.3, 0.5, 3, 0.2) (＠) ０；Ｌ；Ｇ？Ｎ？ＬＭ ＣＨ (＞) , (？) , ；Ｈ＞ tD = 6
Figure 7: From left to right, common opinion trajectories and distributions for dyadic, deliberative, and mixed opinion dynamics within the
structure of different decision-making processes.
small enough to detect significant differences in the estimates
and (2) meaningful for interpretation. For the fixed, one-
valued parameters in Table 2, we use Table 1 to set them to
their minimum, mean, or median values.
4.1. Comments on Dyadic and Deliberative Opinions Dynam-
ics. In this subsection, we present our first results regarding
the deliberative opinion dynamics described in Equation (6)
and its differences with the dyadic dynamics (Equation (5))
in terms of our observations.
4.1.1. Qualitative Analysis of Pair-Wise Opinion Dynamics.
Pair-wise opinion dynamics alone produces multicluster
stable convergencewith variable cluster sizes (see Figures 7(a)
and 7(d)). Insight on the complexity of these dynamics was
discussed in Section 3.2.1.
In Figures 7(a) and 7(d), agents discuss randomly with
one another in pairs. Clusters in the extremes form quickly
since either agents that are close to the extremes attract
one another or are convinced to stay close to the extremes
by interacting with other agents they disagree with. Other
agents with near-extreme positions may be simply attracted
to one of the several moderate foci of agents in the opinion
distribution. On the other hand, moderate agents are either
attracted to the closest opinion focus or pushed towards the
extremes of the distribution. Over time, agents in the central
focus either attract other agents into it or ignore the opinions
of the extreme agents that interact with them. The result of
these dynamics yields amulticlustered convergencewhere the
opinion foci are at least at distance 𝑈 from one another and
only the extreme foci (clusters of agents with |𝑜𝑖| ≥ 0.75) are
at a distance greater than or equal to 𝑇 from one another.The
foci at the bounds of the opinion distribution are very stable
and, in analogy to the (1/2𝑑)-rule in assimilation bounded-
confidence models [33], the number of clusters that form is
roughly equal to 𝑈−1.
4.1.2. Qualitative Analysis of Deliberative Opinion Dynamics.
Qualitatively, deliberative opinion dynamics yield a loose
unipolar convergence of opinions near the center (central
convergence, see Figure 7(b)), near the center of either the left
or right portions of the distribution (group polarization, see
Figure 7(e)) or to a sparse bipolar opinion distribution with
clusters at the center and at the extremes (see Figure 7(c)) if
mixed with pair-wise interactions. This is probably a reason
to expect the variance of opinions, and the proportion of
extremists (almost perfectly correlated: 𝜌 = 0.89, 𝑝 < 0.001),
to be low for these scenarios. The side towards which the
opinion cluster skews depends, essentially, on the valence of
the first argument that is collectively accepted.
In Figures 7(e) and 7(b), agents that update their opin-
ions do so at the same time and only when deliberation
is successful. In these scenarios, every time a decision is
collectively accepted, agents update their opinions towards
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Table 3: Ordinary least squares estimates for pair-wise interactions scenarios for most of the observed metrics.
Dependent variable:𝑉𝑎𝑟(𝑜) 𝑆ℎ 𝑒𝑐 𝑖𝑟(1) (2) (3) (4)
Constant 0.610∗∗∗ 4.429∗∗∗ 0.472∗∗∗ 0.000
(0.002) (0.206) (0.003) (0.000)
𝑈 = 0.6 (𝑈 = 0.2) −0.012∗∗∗ 2.981∗∗∗ 0.061∗∗∗ 0.000
(0.002) (0.260) (0.004) (0.000)
𝑇 = 1.8 (ref. 𝑇 = 1.4) −0.264∗∗∗ −3.261∗∗∗ 0.004 0.000
(0.002) (0.260) (0.004) (0.000)
𝛼 = 0.66 (ref. 𝛼 = 0.5) 0.002 −0.059 −0.100∗∗∗ 0.000
(0.002) (0.184) (0.003) (0.000)
(𝑈, 𝑇) = (0.6, 1.8) (ref. (𝑈, 𝑇) = (0.2, 1.4)) −0.324∗∗∗ −3.728∗∗∗ −0.033∗∗∗ 0.000
(0.003) (0.368) (0.006) (0.000)
Observations 1,440 1,440 1,440 1,440
R2 0.983 0.389 0.529
Adjusted R2 0.983 0.388 0.527
Residual Std. Error (df = 1435) 0.032 3.492 0.053 0.000
F Statistic (df = 4; 1435) 21, 272.740∗∗∗ 228.686∗∗∗ 402.326∗∗∗
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
the argument’s defended position. Hence, if there is voting
and if agents happen to obtain 𝑖𝑛 proposal arguments, they
inexorably cluster towards one or the other side of the opinion
distribution, resulting in opinion convergence remeniscent of
group polarization (see Figure 7(e)). Furthermore, as agents
cluster in the same side of the opinion spectrum, the argu-
ments that may be advanced in deliberation are fewer and
more skewed towards that one side of the opinion spectrum.
Agents become more easily persuaded in deliberation and
only by arguments supporting one side of the spectrum.
Convergence of opinions towards one loose opinion focus
becomes faster and more certain. If there is no vote (see
Figure 7(b)), the dynamics are similar but for the fact that
it is the uniform randomness of the proposal argument that
guarantees a central convergence of opinions.
4.1.3. Quantitative Analysis of Pair-Wise Opinion Dynamics.
The three parameters that allow for quantitative analysis are𝑈 and𝑇, the agents’ attitude structure, and themajority quota
voting rule 𝛼. Table 3 supports the claim that going from 𝛼 =
0.5 to 𝛼 = 0.66 does not affect the variance nor the shifts of
opinions. However, judgment accuracy is significantly higher
when accepting proposals becomes more difficult. This is
rather surprising but also intuitive since decisions that are
taken using more restrictive methods of scrutiny should be
more accurate.
Concerning the attitude structures, the interaction term
between 𝑈 and 𝑇 shows that 𝑈 has a small effect on the
variance of opinions given that 𝑇 is low. This shows that
even when the assimilation threshold is high, a sufficiently
small rejection threshold can make its one-way effect vanish.
However, high levels of both 𝑈 and 𝑇 reduce the variance of
opinions dramatically. In contrast, when it comes to overall
changes in opinion, the magnitude of 𝑈’s one-way marginal
effect increases the shifts of opinions, whereas 𝑇 lowers it.
This can be interpreted as having the rejection dynamics push
moderate-to-extreme agents to positions that are close to
the extremes and very moderate agents to the center of the
distribution. Not too many quantitative changes (on average)
can therefore be observed.The fact that higher𝑈 is associated
with faster convergence of opinions seems to imply lower
judgment accuracy. At some point, voting for the same type of
proposals for too longmay result inmany collectivemistakes.
This is an interesting conclusion to consider in the analysis of
the mixed model. Finally, the interaction term shows that 𝑇
has no strong impact on the metric.
4.1.4. Quantitative Analysis of Deliberative OpinionDynamics.
Seven parameters can be considered for quantitative anal-
ysis in this dynamics: the parameters of interest recalled
in Section 3.1.2, the size of the argument sacks (𝑘), agent
behavior during deliberation, the strength of the deliberation
dynamics (𝛾), and the measure sensitivity to deliberated
results (𝑝𝑎). The most “unexpected” result obtained from
the deliberation dynamics is that it shows how deliberation
contributes to the proportion of extremists and the variance
of opinions. It happens that having more agents discuss
proposals and having more of these discussions increases
the variance of opinions and the proportion of extremists
while lowering judgment inaccuracy and coherence. For the
former, the fact that far too many arguments are advanced
during deliberation plummets the chances that the central
argument is accepted; hence, deliberation does not move
opinions too often. For the latter, we observe that only “big”
differences (going from the lowest value of a parameter to the
highest) in protocol actually prove to have a preponderant
impact on the metrics. These observations hint at a possible
trade-off between judgment accuracy and the variance of
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Table 4: Ordinary least squares estimates for the deliberative interactions scenarios for most of the observed metrics.
Dependent variable:𝑉𝑎𝑟(𝑜) 𝑆ℎ 𝑒𝑐 𝑖𝑟(1) (2) (3) (4)
Constant 0.032∗∗∗ 13.092∗∗∗ 0.370∗∗∗ 1.007∗∗∗
(0.001) (0.406) (0.001) (0.001)
𝑚 = 3 (ref.𝑚 = 1) 0.012∗∗∗ −2.062∗∗∗ −0.012∗∗∗ −0.001
(0.001) (0.276) (0.001) (0.001)
𝑚 = 6 (ref.𝑚 = 1) 0.023∗∗∗ −3.285∗∗∗ −0.018∗∗∗ −0.004∗∗∗
(0.001) (0.276) (0.001) (0.001)
𝑛𝐷 = 0.02 (ref. 𝑛𝐷 = 0.01) 0.007∗∗∗ −0.965∗∗∗ −0.006∗∗∗ −0.002∗∗(0.001) (0.276) (0.001) (0.001)
𝑛𝐷 = 0.05 (ref. 𝑛𝐷 = 0.01) 0.020∗∗∗ −3.316∗∗∗ −0.015∗∗∗ −0.004∗∗∗(0.001) (0.276) (0.001) (0.001)
𝛼 = 0.5 (ref. 𝛼 = 0) 0.146∗∗∗ 68.932∗∗∗ 0.068∗∗∗ −0.507∗∗∗
(0.001) (0.276) (0.001) (0.001)
𝛼 = 0.66 (ref. 𝛼 = 0) 0.291∗∗∗ −13.842∗∗∗ 0.0004 −0.000
(0.001) (0.276) (0.001) (0.001)
𝑘 = 8 (ref. 𝑘 = 4) 0.004∗∗∗ −0.815∗∗∗ −0.002∗∗∗ −0.001
(0.001) (0.276) (0.001) (0.001)
𝑘 = 16 (ref. 𝑘 = 4) 0.008∗∗∗ −1.118∗∗∗ −0.004∗∗∗ −0.003∗∗∗
(0.001) (0.276) (0.001) (0.001)
𝐵𝑒ℎ𝑎V𝑖𝑜𝑟 = “Focused” (ref. “Naive”) 0.015∗∗∗ −1.980∗∗∗ −0.012∗∗∗ −0.004∗∗∗
(0.0005) (0.225) (0.0004) (0.001)
𝛾 = 0.1 (ref. 𝛾 = 0.05) −0.020∗∗∗ 5.762∗∗∗ −0.0003 −0.001
(0.001) (0.276) (0.001) (0.001)
𝛾 = 0.2 (ref. 𝛾 = 0.05) −0.025∗∗∗ 8.648∗∗∗ −0.0003 −0.001
(0.001) (0.276) (0.001) (0.001)
𝑝𝑎 = 0.5 (ref. 𝑝𝑎 = 0.3) −0.013∗∗∗ 1.581∗∗∗ 0.0004 0.0003(0.0005) (0.225) (0.0004) (0.001)
Observations 19,440 19,440 19,440 19,440
R2 0.931 0.844 0.562 0.958
Adjusted R2 0.931 0.844 0.562 0.958
Residual Std. Error (df = 19427) 0.033 15.701 0.030 0.050
F Statistic (df = 12; 19427) 21, 844.790∗∗∗ 8, 733.563∗∗∗ 2, 079.585∗∗∗ 36, 761.250∗∗∗
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
opinions that may be of interest in the mixed discussion
model.
Group coherence, shifts of opinions, and the variance
of opinions are highly affected by the voting threshold:
the coherence metric is reduced by half when allowing for
classic majority voting, shifts explode, and the variance of
opinions increases dramatically. This is not surprising since
the majority quota rule works as a buffer to the success of
decision-making processes and, in consequence, it hampers
the deliberative opinion updates. For the shifts of opinions, it
is clear that the two-third majority voting rule results in little
opinion change and that the simple majority rule induces
group polarization. As expected, there are less extremists in
scenarios where there is no voting and the shifts of opinion
are more likely to happen when agents are more sensitive
to deliberation. When we include voting in the system,
the group’s judgment accuracy decreases due to the correct
deliberated decisions that are vetoed by a salient opinion-
agent majority. Strangely, the effect only holds for the simple
majority decision rule. Lastly, the proportion of individuals
that participate in the debate and the minimal amount of
debates have similar marginal effects on all the metrics (see
Table 4).
4.1.5. Comparing Deliberative and Pair-Wise Opinion Dynam-
ics in a Nuthshell. Qualitatively, both models yield similar
outcomes but for the fact that deliberation never produces
opinion polarization with both types of extremists (see
Figure 7). Furthermore, clusters in the deliberative interac-
tions model are less homogeneous in size and multicluster
convergence occurs only when deliberation is rarely suc-
cessful, which happens sporadically given the calibration of
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Table 5: Mean difference 0.95 confidence intervals for metrics by model comparison.
Model Metric𝑉𝑎𝑟(𝑜) 𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑝𝑒𝑥 𝑆ℎ 𝑒𝑐 𝑖𝑟
Dyadic vs. Deliberative [0.191, 0.216] [0.170, 0.197] [-29.48, -28.28] [0.074, 0.082] [0.165, 0.172]
Mixed vs. Deliberative [0.142, 0.147] [0.150, 0.155] [-20.85, -19.76] [0.003, 0.002] [-0.038, -0.030]
Mixed vs. Dyadic [-0.072, -0.046] [-0.045, -0.018] [8.332, 8.859] [-0.079, -0.071] [-0.205, -0.201]
the model. On the other hand, pair-wise opinion dynamics
produces multicluster convergence most of the time and
central convergence only in the infrequent cases where the
latitude of acceptance is large.
The comparison of these two scenarios in terms of
the metrics is straightforward. Whilst dyadic interactions
allow for more variability in opinions through pair-wise
interactions and more mistakes in judging proposals, delib-
erative updates simply act as an antagonist force. On aver-
age, the deliberative interaction model produces opinion
distributions with smaller variance and yields steady states
with higher judgment accuracy, a higher shift statistic, and,
naturally, lower group coherence since only proposals that are
deliberated 𝑖𝑛 are eligible for voting (see Table 5).
4.2. Articulating Dyadic and Deliberative Social Interactions
in Opinion Dynamics. So far we have considered scenarios
where argumentation had no place and where individuals
made decisions according to opinions that were purely
constructed from pair-wise discussions. We also observed
cases in which agents formed their opinions only by inte-
grating deliberated proposals into their opinion updates. The
scenarios we present in this section combine the two pre-
ceding scenarios to account for both, the effects of pair-wise
discussion and the effects of deliberation on opinions, judg-
ment accuracy, and group coherence. From the preceding
observations, we conclude the following: deliberative opinion
dynamics reduces the variance and the proportion of extrem-
ists because it shifts opinions greatly and polarizes groups
by eliminating at least one type of extremist, the one whose
opinions are initially opposed to the deliberated results;
or it brings opinions close to neutrality (see Figure 7(b)).
This may not be desired in a group since the diversity and
stability of opinions are necessary for deliberation to make
sense and lead to the collective acceptance of controversial
proposals. Dyadic opinion dynamics, on the other hand,
tend to increase the variance of opinions and the number
of extremists while having a lesser aggregated effect on the
shifts of opinion. This is an immediate result of the pair-wise
interaction dynamics inasmuch as it polarizes individuals
very quickly.
To sum up, in the mixed interactions model, deliberation
hinders the effect of voting on opinions by making some
proposals that would normally be submitted for voting not
eligible for voting. It may also undo opinion changes due
to pair-wise interactions. The mixed model can be seen as
the deliberation opinion dynamics model in which pair-wise
interactions occur in between collective discussion and may
affect which arguments are advanced during deliberation.
Equivalently, it can be seen as the dyadic opinion dynamics
model in which deliberation accounts for endogenous
“shocks” on the opinion distribution.
4.2.1. Qualitative Analysis of the Mixed Dynamics. In Figures
7(c) and 7(f), agents update their opinions through delibera-
tion and pair-wise interactions. Opinion trajectories visuals
show a combination of both previously described opinion
trajectories. Over time, as agents discuss with one another,
opinion clusters form as in the pair-wise or dyadic opinion
dynamics. Deliberation may disrupt the formation of these
clusters and three different situations may occur:
(i) Deliberation disrupts the formation of the opinion
clusters but not sufficiently to jeopardize pair-wise
opinion cluster formation (e.g. for high values 𝑡𝐷).
Two phenomena may be responsible for it: (1) the
variability of the proposal argument’s support for the
principle P and (2) too few (successive) deliberation
steps that result in opinion updates. Once the opinion
clusters are formed, successful deliberation foreshad-
ows the merging of the previously formed clusters,
may bring extremists closer to moderate agents, and,
thanks to the assimilation component of the pair-wise
dynamics, allow bigger and more moderate opinion
clusters to form (refer to Figure 7(c)).
(ii) Deliberation significantly disrupts the pair-wise
dynamic formation of clusters. This may happen
when the requirements for accepting proposals are
weak in the decision-making process (e.g. low 𝛼). In
this case, one has either central convergence, since
all agents follow the deliberated results in the same
manner, or 3-cluster convergence with two extreme
opinion foci. In the latter situation, the extreme
groups form quickly (like in the pair-wise model) and
deliberation cannot pull extreme agents away from
the extreme foci they are in. The main reason for this
is that immediately after an extreme agent attempts to
leave her foci through deliberation updates, she gets
pulled or pushed back into it by means of a dyadic
interaction with another extreme agent.
(iii) Deliberation does not disrupt the formation of the
opinions cluster. This is the rare case scenario for
very demanding decision-making processes in terms
of inclusion (e.g. 𝑛𝐷) and argument acceptability (e.g.𝛼). Opinions converge as in the pair-wise opinion
dynamics model (refer to Figures 7(a) and 7(d)).
Last, when there is voting (𝛼 ̸= 0), the position of
the moderate opinion cluster is determined by the first
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Figure 8: Significant correlation estimates for themetrics of interest
in the mixed opinion dyamics scenarios.
accepted proposal argument and/or the opinionmajority that
is formed from previous dyadic interactions (see Figure 7(f)).
4.2.2. Relating the Metrics of Interest in Mixed Opinion
Dynamics. The first thing to notice is that for all of these
scenarios, all the metrics are significantly correlated (see
Figure 8). The variance of opinions and the proportion of
extremists are almost perfectly correlated. To some extent,
this means that a high variance of opinions, known that
the mean of opinions is statistically null, equates to having
many extremists in the population, be towards one or the
other side of the opinion distribution (e.g. extreme bipolar-
ization). Similarly, we find a negative and strong correlation
between the judgment inaccuracymeasure and the coherence
coefficient (see Figure 8)—when judgment inaccuracy is high
(low), coherence to deliberation is low (high). Cases like
these are telling since they may be related to sequences of
collective decisions in which agents do not make too many
mistakes when judging proposal arguments and still make
deliberated decisions that are, on average, in line with their
principles.
The shift statistic, interestingly, is negatively correlated
with the variance of opinions, with judgment accuracy, and
with the coherence coefficient. In a way, this means that
having more moderate agents conduces, on average, to more
mistakes in judging arguments and to less coherent collective
decisions. An explanation for this phenomenon could be that
as agents reach consensus in opinion, important (possibly
extreme) arguments for correctly judging argument propos-
als are not advanced in the deliberation arena,which results in
more mistakes and in possibly accepting proposal arguments
that, after voting, are not meant to be accepted. Indeed, the
negative correlation between the variance of opinions and
judgment inaccuracy points towards this direction since, on
average, the more shifts there are, the smaller the variance of
opinions is (see Figure 8).
4.2.3. Comparing Mixed Dynamics with Other Monolithic
Dynamics of Interactions. Qualitatively, opinion trajectories
in the mixed model are more chaotic than in the pair-
wise and deliberative interaction models (see Figure 7). As
analyzed previously, deliberation dynamics disrupt the pair-
wise dynamics and create situations in which central and
multiclustered convergence (with two clusters at the extremes
of the distribution) are possible, at the expense of more
(pair-wise dynamics) or less (deliberative dynamics) clusters.
It tolerates the survival of very small isolated group of
agents that the previous models rarely tolerate in a hundred
collective decision-making steps (see Figure 7(c)).
One of the most interesting observations one can make
of this family of models regards how groups change (in terms
of our metrics) when dyadic social interactions are added
to deliberative interactions and vice-versa. When comparing
the mixed interactions with only deliberative ones, shifts,
agents’ aggregated change in opinions, are, on average, less
pronounced. The variance of opinions and the proportion
of extremists are significantly higher for the former than for
the latter; group coherence, in contrast, is lower with respect
to the scenarios where opinions are formed only through
deliberation. Judgment accuracy follows that same trend.
A reason for this might be that mixed dynamics are faster
to yield semistable clusters and/or opinion convergence. In
consequence, the potential argument pool for deliberative
exchange shrinks faster and deliberation becomes less effec-
tive over time, which results in more collective mistakes. The
outcomeon coherence is predictable inasmuch as deliberative
interactions produce group polarization. If a group agrees in
opinion, debates are sterile because themembers of the group
will most likely refrain from attacking the proposal argu-
ments they all support and will work together to disparage
the proposal arguments they do not support (see Table 5).
In the same manner, we report that the proportion of
extremists and the variance of opinions are barely lower in
the pair-wise interaction model when including deliberation
in the decision-making process. Shifts of opinions are also
barely lower when there is no deliberation. This can indicate
that deliberation does not undo the changes in opinion
due to pair-wise interactions nor does it amplifies them. In
contrast, when we consider the labeling-based metrics, the
mixed interaction model ensures lower judgment inaccuracy
because of deliberation and lower group coherence (see
Table 5).
In sum, the mixed discussion model is a compromise
between the pair-wise interaction and deliberative opinion
dynamic models in that it offers some guarantees in terms
of judgment accuracy and coherence, while allowing for
“reasonable” variance in the opinion pool. It establishes some
kind of trade-off between labeling-based metrics and the
variance of opinions that may be of interest for decision-
making process design.
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Table 6: Summary of sign or relative marginal effects for all varying parameters on dyadic, deliberative, and mixed interactions models in
and for all experiments.
Metrics Parameters𝑡𝐷 𝑚 𝑛𝐷 𝛼 𝑇 𝑈 𝑝𝑎 𝛾 𝑘 𝐵𝑒ℎ𝑎V𝑖𝑜𝑟𝑉𝑎𝑟(𝑜) XX X X O X X X X X X𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑝𝑒𝑥 XX X X O X X X X X X𝑆ℎ XX X X O X X X X X𝑒𝑐 XX X X XO X XOO XOO X X𝑖𝑟 XX X X O XO O X OOX XOO X X
Nota: gray symbols correspond to dyadic dynamics, light gray to deliberative dynamics, and bold black to mixed dynamics. Given a scenario, the symbol 𝑋
stands for constant parameter and 𝑂 for insignificant marginal effect, and as parameters grow: for positive (negative) marginal effect for the parameter.
From left to right at the parameter level, the leftmost arrow corresponds to the scenario with the strongest (in absolute value) marginal effect of the parameter
(with respect to to its factors). Example: Let 𝑝 be a parameter, and 𝑂 stands for “𝑝 has a significant positive effect in dyadic discussion scenario, negative
in the deliberative one, and insignificant in mixed discussion. The positive effect in dyadic discussion is greater than the absolute value of the negative one in
the purely deliberative scenario.”
4.2.4. Comments on the Differences between the Three Models
for OLS Regression Estimates. The significance of most of the
regression parameters estimated for the mixed interactions
scenarios are similar to those estimated for the pure dyadic
anddeliberative scenarios.Nevertheless, themagnitude of the
effects is different insomuch that the dynamics themselves
are different. So, instead of commenting the linear regression
estimates of the mixed model, we compare, when possible,
the standardized significant coefficients of the regressors of
the mixed model with those of the pair-wise and deliberative
interactionmodels (see Table 6 for a summary of the results).
In mixed interactions, for instance, the influence of𝑚 on
the opinion distribution is much more preponderant than in
the deliberative dynamics scenarios. Going from 𝑚 = 1 to𝑚 = 3 increases the standard variation units of the variance of
opinions by twice as much as the one in the deliberative sce-
narios.This, in particular, is due to the design of the decision-
making process. If 𝑚 is higher, then the number of social
influence steps (𝑡𝐷) in the decision process is also higher
(compared to 𝑡𝐷 = 0 in the deliberative case). If we decide
to consider these steps as contributing to the variance of
opinions, then the effect of𝑚 on the variance of opinions has
to be stronger in the mixed interactions model. In contrast,
the number of agents participating in the debate has a weaker
effect on the variance of opinions in the mixed interactions
model than in the deliberative dynamics, specially for 𝑛𝐷 =0.05 (more than twice as much). The difference may come
from the fact that, in mixed discussions, the part of the
argument pool used in deliberation is more restrictive than
in the deliberative case. We can argue that since pair-wise
dynamics may get individuals closer to one another after
some deliberation, the same happens to the arguments that
individuals will most likely use in deliberation. Taking this
into account means that deliberation will, at many instances,
be unfruitful and have no effect on opinions, thus failing to
moderate extreme opinions and/or polarize the group. In the
same direction, a high number of participants in deliberation
can make the deliberation dynamics stiff. In this case, the
distribution of opinion is close to the uniform distribution,
which has a relatively high-to-moderate variancewith respect
to the reference results.
The strength of the deliberative dynamics has a positive
stronger effect on the variance of opinions in themixedmodel
than in the deliberative model when 𝛾 = 0.2, and a negative
weaker one when 𝛾 = 0.1. A sound interpretation of this
result is that when deliberation is successful and its effect on
opinions does not get agents to move sufficiently away from
their current positions, agents are pulled or pushed back to
their previously held opinions: the variance of opinions does
not changemuch.On the other hand, if the effect of successful
deliberation is strong, opinions can change sufficiently to
make agents much more prone to assimilation into moderate
opinion foci: the variance of opinions falls.
The deliberative opinion dynamics model is much more
sensitive to 𝛼 than the mixed discussion model. Differ-
ences in marginal effects can double. The probability of
attraction to deliberated results (𝑝𝑎), for instance, has a
strongmoderating effect (negative) on agents’ opinions in the
deliberative opinion dynamics but a meager one (two-fold)
in the mixed and dyadic dynamic models. This is because
opinion updates in the deliberative model depend only on
that parameter, whereas in the mixed model more numerous
types of interactions make opinion updates possible.
In terms of judgment accuracy, all parameters except the
size of the argument sacks (𝑘) have a significant, slightly
stronger effect on the deliberative dynamics than in themixed
model. In effect, the difference may be attributed to the
upshot of pair-wise interactions on the distribution of opin-
ions and on the arguments that would be advanced during
deliberation. The result respecting parameter 𝑘, however, is
counterintuitive. Since argument sacks are static, scenarios
where shifts are higher should make 𝑘 more important for
deliberation to succeed and it is precisely in the scenarios of
pure deliberative dynamics that we find the biggest opinion
shifts. This may point to the hypothesis that in deliberative
interactions agents change opinions substantially but do not
often change their adherence to the principle (go from a
negative opinion to a positive one or vice versa) when there
is no group polarization.
4.3. Sensitivity Analysis for the Procedural Parameters of
Interest. Weperform a sensitivity analysis of the observations
on the parameters of interest in themixed interactionsmodel.
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We extend the parameter domains of the pure dyadic and
deliberative scenarios, as we make it explicit in Table 2.
4.3.1. Minimum Number of Debates (𝑚). We observe that the
minimum number of debates has a significant, well-observed
effect on all of our metrics excluding group coherence. For
the variance of opinions, we can observe that the more
debates there are, the bigger the value of the metric is;
although the higher 𝑛𝐷 and 𝑡𝐷 are, the weaker the overall
effect of𝑚 becomes (Figures 9(d) and 9(a)). Furthermore, the
marginal effect of increasing minimal debates is decreasing:
an additional deliberation step requirement increases the
variance of opinions but less and less as it grows. 𝑚, coupled
with 𝑛𝐷, has a shy S-shaped effect (see Figure 9(d)) on the
variance of opinions, meaning that it has a stronger effect
when 𝑛𝐷 is low, which suggests a possible trade-off between
the number of arguments accepted in the debate and the
number of debates required before accepting a proposal.
In contrast, the shifts in opinion are less and less likely
as 𝑚 grows and this is independent of the variations of the
other parameters. Again, the effect is marginally decreasing
and is only truly significant when 𝛼 = 0.5. An explanation
to these effects may be linked to the design of the system.
First, the variance of opinions is higher when deliberation is
asked for because the more deliberation steps there are, the
higher the chances are that the central proposal argument
is deemed unacceptable, specially when agents are focused.
Furthermore,mechanically speaking, increasing theminimal
amount of debates implies that, whenever a decision is to be
taken, at least 𝑚 × 𝑡𝐷 time steps have to take place and if, at
any moment, a proposal argument is considered undecided,𝑡𝐷 time steps are added to the process. So, unless the debate
does not yield 𝑢𝑛𝑑 labels for proposal arguments (highly
unlikely considering that 𝜎 = grounded semantics), the more
nondeliberation steps there are in the decision process, the
higher the variance of opinions is. Concerning the shifts,
when 𝛼 ̸= 0.5, either the system is too stiff to accept any
proposal argument, and opinions do not changemuch, or the
effects of pair-wise discussion and deliberation cancel out in
such a way that individual shifts are minimal (Figure 9(b)).
On the side of labeling-based metrics, the more debates
are asked for, the more accurate a group is in its judgment,
the effect being smaller as 𝑚 grows. When agents are naive,
the effect is quasilinear, while when they are focused, the
strongest effects of acquiring more deliberation are found
when levels of deliberation are already low (Figure 9(f)).This
can be explained by the fact that the more debates there
are in the decision process, the closer one gets to the ideal
argumentation framework.
4.3.2. Proportion of the Population in Deliberation Steps (𝑛𝐷).
Like for 𝑚, 𝑛𝐷 has a significant effect on the proportion
of extremists and on the shifts and variance of opinions
(Figure 9(e)). This may result from the fact that being able
to put more arguments in play at the same debate step may
increase the odds of revealing cycles around the proposal
argument in𝐴𝐹𝜀. Given that we use grounded semantics, the
arguments in the cycles are labeled 𝑢𝑛𝑑 and, in consequence,
debates are more often postponed when 𝑛𝐷 is higher. Post-
poning debates, in turn, increases the number of nondebates
steps in the decision process, which increases the variance
of opinions and limits, over time, the moderating effect of
deliberation. Moreover, the effect of this parameter is very
dependent on the value of 𝛼 (Figure 9(e)). For shifts, for
instance, 𝛼 = 0.5 makes the effect of 𝑛𝐷 negative, while𝛼 = 0 makes it positive but to a lesser extent. Furthermore,
for higher requirements of deliberation (𝑚), adding more
individuals to the deliberation process has weaker effects
on the variance of opinions and on the other metrics. It is
also quite interesting to notice that it has the same effect on
agents independently of agent behavior during deliberation.
This is a surprising result as one would have expected more
focused agents in a deliberation arena to cause a raise in
the proportion of extremists as they play to knock out
opposing proposal arguments, and thereof reducing the effect
of deliberation (lowers variance) on the whole population.
Finally, similar to𝑚, addingmore people into the deliber-
ation process increases judgment accuracy (see Figure 9(c))
and has no clear effect, if any, on group coherence (see
Figure 9(i)).
4.3.3. Steps between Deliberation Steps (𝑡𝐷). In all configu-
rations, 𝑡𝐷 increases the proportion of extremists (variance)
and decreases the shifts of opinions among agents. The
shifts and the effect on the variance of opinions are present
for 𝛼 = 0.5, insignificant otherwise (Figure 9(b)). 𝑡𝐷 is
highly linked to 𝑚 by construction. When 𝑚 = 1, the
curve linking the variance of opinions and 𝑡𝐷 is convex. As𝑚 increases, the curve becomes more and more concave,
which means that 𝑡𝐷 has a more important effect on the
opinion distribution as collective decisions take longer to be
achieved. This seems counterintuitive but in reality it reflects
themultiplicative relationship between deliberation and pair-
wise interactions and the semantics in the model. If 𝑚 is low
and 𝑡𝐷 is high, the effective number of pair-wise interactions
is, on average, smaller in the deliberation process. Hence,
the structure of the decision-making process hinders any
increase in the variance of opinions. If𝑚 is high, the opposite
effect is observed. Additionally, since the grounded semantics
yields few 𝑖𝑛 arguments with respect to other admissibility-
based semantics, getting closer to the ideal argumentation
frameworkmaymake it difficult to obtain the expected effects
of deliberative discussion on agents. Lower 𝑚 constrains the
variance of opinions by making deliberation more influential
on opinions.
In terms of judgment accuracy and coherence, we observe
that 𝑡𝐷 does not explain coherence, yet it tends to decrease
judgment inaccuracy. This may be due to a more varied
argument pool in the debate which, in turn, may be a
consequence of a higher variance of opinions or vice versa.
4.3.4. Acceptability Voting Quota (𝛼). By far, it is the most
influential parameter in our study. It changes the direction
and the intensity of the effect of all the other procedural
parameters and, by construction, heavily constrains the road
to accepting a proposal (see Figure 9).
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Figure 9: Curves of mean observations for different parameters and metrics for 36,000 runs. Bars are 0.95 confidence intervals. Plots with
the same observables (ordinate), except for 𝑖𝑟, are on the same scale.
Complexity 23
The higher the requirement for accepting the proposal is,
the higher the proportion of extremists and the variance of
opinions are and the lower the shift statistic is. In few words,𝛼 constrains the world to dyadic discussion or throws it into
a process in which deliberation is much more important
than dyadic interactions. This is why, for any 𝛼 ̸= 0.5, one
either gives too much weight to deliberated results, which
shadows pair-wise interactions, or too little weight in the
sense that no deliberated result is ever accepted and thus
never integrated into the opinions of the agents that have
voted for it. The reason for the latter is that the latitude
acceptance is too low and, thereafter, pair-wise interactions
are not enough to unevenly polarize the population in such a
way that deliberated proposal arguments are voted favorably
by a non-negligeable majority. Shifts for 𝛼 = 0 are stable for
different levels of 𝑡𝐷, which implies that deliberation keeps in
check all the shifts of opinions related to an increase in the
number of pair-wise interactions. For 𝛼 = 0.5, deliberation
is less likely to be successful and shifts tend towards the shift
levels for 𝛼 = 0 (see Figure 9(b)).
Concerning labeling-basedmetrics,𝛼 entirely determines
the coherence statistic. For 𝛼 ̸= 0.5, there is no difference in
coherence because of how coherence is defined: it is maximal
when 𝛼 = 0 and, strangely, maximal when 𝛼 = 0.66
(see Figure 9(h)). Surprisingly, 𝛼 has no effect on judgment
accuracy. One would have expected a higher 𝛼 to increase
judgment accuracy since agents would hardly collectively
accept a proposal argument discussed during deliberation.
Proposal arguments have, given how the argument lattice is
generated, a higher probability of being rejected than of being
accepted in the ideal argumentation framework.
4.3.5. A Word on Focused and Naive Agents. Focused and
naive specifications for agent behavior are an important
parameter in the decision process since they model how
agents choose arguments in the deliberation arena. In the sce-
narios where agents are focused, agents show equal or higher
variance of opinions and are therefore more extreme (see
Figure 9(g)), independently of the voting requirements. Shifts
of opinion are less likely as well. We can see this happening
because focused agents knock out proposal arguments more
often than naive agents, provided that 𝑛𝐷 is low.
One could have expected naive agents to yield more
coherent decisions since they argue sincerely. However, this
seems not to be the case (see Figure 9(i)). Agents are unable to
deliberate in away thatmakes deliberation reflect their voting
intentions either because they do not have the necessary
arguments to do so or because such arguments do not exist.
In terms of judgment accuracy, focused agents do better
than naive agents in finding the ideal labels for the proposal
arguments. This is likely because, when reconstructing the
framework, focused agents take into account the deliberated
proposal argument and choose themost pertinent arguments
in their sacks that relate to the state of affairs at the deliber-
ation arena. In fine, debates result in a better approximation
ofL𝑎𝑏𝜀(𝐼) even though one could have believed the opposite;
that is, focused agents are ready to sacrifice a correct collective
label of a proposal argument in the goal of defending their
positions.
4.4. Points of Discussion. In this subsection, we discuss the
results obtained from the simulations. We attempt to make
sense of them from a social sciences perspective.
4.4.1. Opinion Consensus and Dissensus. The deliberative
opinion dynamics corresponds to the simulated scenarios in
which the variance of opinions is at its lowest and judgment
accuracy at its highest. Dyadic opinion dynamics are associ-
ated with the scenarios in which the variance of opinions is at
its highest, judgment accuracy at its lowest, and coherence at
itsmaximumpossible level.Themixed interactions dynamics
is a combination of these aspects for all the metrics except
for coherence at which it is the worse—deliberation leads
to some kind of loose opinion consensus that is reinforced
by pair-wise interactions. Likewise, the mixed discussion
model confirms some results exposed in [16] expressing
that opinions and voting intentions in a deliberative context
“often change.” That being said, and more particularly in
deliberative opinion dynamics, outputs align well with two
interesting results on consensus formation given by an
interpretation of Moscovici and Doise’s [15] work, Sunstein’s
[14] account on deliberation and group polarization, and
social impact theory [4]. The first states that mild consensus
is reached in deliberation as procedure disengages agents;
the second is that, within discussion groups, majorities tend
to become larger and opinions more extreme—not on the
basis of competing arguments but of the initial balance of
opinions. After several decision processes, we find opinion
distributions that reflect these observations even though we
are not able to precisely coin the set of parameters that yields
such distributions (see Figure 7).
Although differences between mixed and dyadic opinion
dynamics in terms of the variance of opinions and shifts
are slim, the former does much better in terms of judg-
ment accuracy. In this sense, deliberation does moderate
opinions, but not as much when non-deliberation steps are
relatively frequent throughout the decision-making process.
In terms of Moscovici and Doise theory of consensus [15],
this makes sense since pair-wise discussion engages or ego-
involve agents in the discussion and pushes to convergence
of opinion at the extremes of the opinion distribution.
However, what remains unclear is the reason why procedural
parameters that constrain deliberation do not disengage
agents from discussion and thus result in a mild consensus,
as also expressed by Moscovici and Doise [15]. A possible
explanation of this phenomenon may stem from the fact
that deliberation in the model is always accompanied by a
series of ego-involving discussions that shadowor counter the
moderating effect of deliberation. Not only this, deliberation
could also be responsible for crystallizing the opinions of
extremists for it favors one or the other part of the distribution
of opinions, as explained in [14] and to some extent in [13].
Furthermore, the mixed discussion model gives an example
of polarization that results from a minority of dissenters
on one side of an issue acceding to views of the majority’s
side [4], as opposed to the strong polarization observed in
dyadic interactions. Situations in which the status quo or
the undecidability of the proposal argument lingers cannot
possibly yield situations of moderation. In cognitive science,
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one can be inclined to believe that the longer a deliberation
process is, the more likely individuals will take an immutable
stance on the situation. In view of the assumption that long
decision-making processes can be more costly for a group or
society as a whole, agents may feel forced to take a stance
just for the sake of ending the process. The stance that is
adopted would therefore depend on pair-wise interactions
among individuals and not on deliberation, since deliberation
takes too long to be conclusive.
4.4.2. For Hypothetical Recommendations in Decision-Making
Process Elaboration. On another tune, results from themodel
suggest that procedural parameters have marginally decreas-
ing positive or negative effects on the metrics of interest. In
a hypothetical policy analysis perspective, this may indicate
that, after choosing a correct number of individuals and
imposing the right amount of debates, one can attain rea-
sonable levels of judgment accuracy, coherence, and variance
of opinions. As accounted in [18], deliberation increases
knowledge (collective knowledge as well) and, therefore, it
heightens the chances of making correct decisions. If one
believes that social welfare is linked to deliberation and
eventually to the metrics studied previously, then procedural
parameters can both be used as an instrument to attain
desired levels of social welfare and reinforce the notion
of legitimacy of collective decisions. It can also provide a
justification for choosing a deliberation regime rather than
another on the basis of how important (or urgent) a topic of
discussion is. Indeed, if we adopt the claim that deliberation
is a forerunner of welfare, then any state in which deliberative
cues are at their maximum (highest number of participants,
many deliberation steps before making a decision, and as
frequent as possible) has to be mapped to the highest attain-
able social welfare. In this case, is a situation where judgment
accuracy is at its highest yet the variance of opinions or the
proportion of extremists at its lowest an ideal situation? We
cannot say for sure since strong opinion consensus and long
decision-making processes, in many situations, may result in
a loss of welfare rather than in a gain of it.
Another interesting result in procedure for deliberation
is the very similar estimates we find for the effects of the
minimum number (𝑚) of debates necessary to make a
decision on a proposal and the proportion (𝑛𝐷) of individuals
participating in deliberation on judgment accuracy. In the
scope of social welfare, this raises the question of whether
advocating for longer decision processes by demandingmore
deliberation steps (higher 𝑚) rather than bigger debates
(higher 𝑛𝐷) may increase welfare. Depending on the objec-
tives of the decider of the deliberation procedure, he or she
may choose to concentrate on one or the other. A recom-
mendation we can assert from the mixed social interactions
model is that if one prefers low to high variance of opinions,
and/or high to low coherence, the decider is better off if
she focuses on increasing the size of the debate rather than
organizing debates very frequently. One of the reasons for
this might be that when making bigger debates, all agents are
truly considered as equals in the decision-making process.
In organizing many debates, individuals that are chosen to
participate in many of these will be more influential and will
somehow bias the set of arguments in the deliberation arena.
Themajority rulemodeled through𝛼 also determines the size
of the shifts and the distribution of opinions. Because a bigger𝛼 is associated with higher levels of extremism and opinion
variance, deliberated cues are harder to accept and, therefore,
it becomesmore difficult for agents to reach concensus and/or
moderate their opinions.
On the other hand and further into the idea of legitimacy,
the goal of deliberative processes is the agreement among
all participants. This agreement stands for the right or best
decision from a formal or procedural perspective and it is also
the best from a substantive point of view. In other words, the
legitimacy of decisions not only derives fromwell-established
procedural requirements (respect of the protocol) but also
begs for the fulfillment of two essential conditions: (1) satisfy-
ing the procedural requirements for a correct procedure (for-
mal legitimacy) and (2) the rational acceptability of the results
of this procedure (substantive acceptability). Legitimacy can
be then obtained from the coherence statistic scrutinized
in the model insofar as it measures how well agents accept
the results of a correct procedure (e.g. deliberation). So, for
a proposal to be legitimate, one has to choose parameters
that would maximize group coherence in decision-making
processes.
As deliberation may give rise to consensus in the delib-
eration arena, it may also sow the seeds of dissensus in
the group. Our model clearly illustrates this phenomenon
through the procedural parameters of deliberation and the
metrics observed. From another perspective in deliberative
democracy, dissensus in collective decision-making may be
desirable. According to Landermore and Page’s accounts [36],
lack of consensus can be perceived as having agents with
alternative ideas that, combined with other ideas, can provide
a better approximation of the ideal status of an argument.The
authors in [36] call this dissensus “positive dissensus” and
it makes normative sense when solving complex collective
decision-making problems. Our model captures the idea
of having normative requirements to define a good and
legitimate collective decision: requirements of high consen-
sual deliberative accuracy (judgment accuracy), of legitimacy
(coherence), and of diversity (variance of opinions) are all
taken into account, and, for such, we can conclude that our
model is successful in describing a sound process of collective
decision-making with interpretable outcomes.
Of course, the present simulation results and analysis do
not prove that all opinion dynamics can be accounted for
by such simple processes like the one presented here. They
do, however, shed light on the expressiveness of combining
different paradigms to account formore interpretablemodels
and pave the way to creating original models of the sort.
The simulations suggest the desirability of discovering the
consequences of relatively simple laws of communication at
different levels (micro, meso, and macro) to determine what
still needs to be explained.
5. Related Work
We see our model as a contribution to the influence and
opinion dynamics field in ABM and a pragmatic application
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of abstract argumentation theory. To our knowledge, we are
unaware of existing literature on agent-based modeling that
explicitly relates collective choice and the notions of deliber-
ation and opinion diffusion through abstract argumentation
as we have done it.
Most models in the literature of opinion diffusion are
interested in opinions because these have an influence in
collective decision and in questions of social order. For
instance, in [3] the authors are interested in consensus and
in how a group collectively chooses among two alternatives.
In other models, authors are interested in the emergence
of extremism [8] and on the distribution of opinions when
extremists are introduced in the population [5, 33, 37], while
other authors coin the notion of opinion polarization as an
emergent property of the system [8, 12]. They show, using
models of “bounded confidence” and opinion diffusion with
trust, that three different kinds of steady states (unipolar,
bipolar, and central) are possible depending on whether
agents are sufficiently uncertain about their opinions and
sufficiently connected and/or a certain proportion of indi-
viduals are already extreme. Recent articles on information
and opinion dynamics stress the importance of governance
and government intervention in the spread of emotions
(opinions), in the frangibility of social consensus system.
In [10], the authors show that government intervention in
the spread of negative emotions can lead to an even faster
spread of negative emotions (single-peeked convergence) and
in a faster collapse of the social consensus system. Opinion
as a function of trust is studied in [12] and relates to how
individuals form their opinions on the basis of how much
they trust agents in their networks.
Another stream of discrete opinion dynamics models
that explain the emergence of opinion can be found in the
literature. Computer multiagent models of attitude change
based on Latane’s social impact theory are presented in [4]. In
the theory, an agent changes her opinion on the basis of the
informational impact she is subject to which depends on the
persuasiveness (strength), supportiveness, and immediacy
(group structure) of the environment and information she
receives. The simulations predict two emergent groups of
phenomena: the shifting of attitudes towards incompletely
polarized equilibria and the formation of coherent clustering
of subgroups with deviant attitudes. Similarly, but in a
continuous, more argumentative fashion, Ma¨s and Flache
[11] present a model of opinion diffusion using arguments.
Arguments are considered to be for or against a proposal and
are given an agent-dependant relevance in dyadic persuasive
interactions. Arguments also determine the agents’ opinions
and their dissimilarities, which posits the rules of pair-wise
encounters in theirmodel as agents are assumed to form their
opinions according to the arguments they own. They show
that in an argumentative opinion diffusion model, the only
observable steady states are bipolarization and consensus
and that bipolarization can emerge from interactions among
similar agents. In other words, bipolarization of opinions
is possible with homophily and without negative influence
if there is argumentation. They subsequently compare their
results to experimental data. In [38], a similar approach to
argumentation and opinion formation is taken but for the fact
that they introduce different types of arguments, explicitly
apply social judgment theory [22], and use survey data to
establish model-to-real-world comparisons.
Closer to opinion formation and abstract argumentation,
Gabbriellini and Torroni [39] are the first to have origi-
nally and soundly merged opinion diffusion and abstract
argumentation. They define an agent’s opinion as a function
of the arguments she holds and the attack relation among
them. They devised a focused peer-to-peer dialogue system
of persuasion (NetArg), inspired from Mercier and Sperber’s
argumentative theory of reasoning [40], which used only
abstract argumentation to study opinion polarization and
opinion dynamics. Moreover, they considered networks and
the notions of trust and epistemic vigilance to define a
dynamics for knowledge revision and trust itself, which
we clearly lack in our model. They showed that if a con-
servative belief operator in argumentation was applied by
agents when they reasoned, then their dialogue protocol
did not increase polarization among agents. That said, they
used the model to study the effect of Groenvetter’s weak
link theory in the spreading of arguments and were not
particularly interested in notions like judgment accuracy or
coherence, nor in tackling questions related to collective
decision-making procedures. Their system is very expressive
and helps position our work in the litterature: our work is at
the frontier of pure argumentative opinion diffusion models,
opinion diffusion with arguments, and continuous bounded-
confidence models of opinion diffusion a` la Deffuant.
On another note, work on collective cognitive conver-
gence [41] and opinion sharing [19] shows that consensus
towards a certain “correct” opinion or cognitive state is always
possible yet dependent on noise, variability, and awareness
of agents. In [20], the authors show that learning about an
exogenous correct state of the world (represented by bits)
under confidence was possible but only if the agents were
not too confident. In a homogeneous population, they show
that the higher the confidence, the worse the learning—the
very confident agents do not learn the properties of the true
state of the world and disrupt the learning process of the less
confident ones. Collective cognitive convergence can be seen
as a result of deliberation in truth-seeking models.
When it comes to abstract argumentation theory, we take
an approach that wires two types of dialogues that are well-
studied in the literature: persuasion dialogues [42] and delib-
eration dialogues [43]. Another interesting line of work is the
one on mechanism design [44], or the problem of devising
an argumentation protocol where strategic argumentation is
not a liability for success in debates. We tackle mechanism
design in a different way, though. Instead of considering
strategy-proofness, we are interested in how differences in
protocol can result in epistemologically “better” collective
choices and guarantee that opinion distributions are favorable
for deliberation. For a survey on persuasion dialogue, see
[42].
Work on agent-based argumentation usually assumes that
the semantic relationship between arguments is fixed. In
other words, if two individuals were to put two arguments
in the public arena such that one logically attacked the other,
then everyone would agree that such attack exists [45, 46].
26 Complexity
Other models which do not make this restrictive assumption
can also be found in the literature [27, 47] and derive from
the class or family of opponent models [27, 48] in which two
opposing sides attempt to win a dialogue. Ourmodel is in the
intersection of these two, but the frame combining opinion
diffusion of the kind and argumentation remains new.
The idea of mixing interpersonal influence and vertical
communication, however, is not original. It is described and
implemented in innovation diffusion models such as [5, 49].
In both, vertical communication is modeled as exogenous
transparent information—agents are aware of the existence
of an innovation thus triggering several processes of choice
and stabilization of opinions. Also, in [50] an Eulerian model
is implemented to show the effect of media and exogenous
information on opinion distributions. With respect to this
point, the originality of our work is in that the information
emitted as vertical communication is endogenous. It is issued
from a deliberation model that agents shape on the basis
of their opinions, arguments, and behavior. In the spirit of
[51], where the authors control for the design of vertical
communication (to whom the vertical communication is
addressed, its timing, how it influences agents opinions), we
control for the process generating the information for our
own set of variables: length of debates, majority quotas, and
the frequency at which discussions take place.
6. Conclusion and Perspectives
The main objective of this article was to build a bridge
where decision-making, argumentation, and opinion dif-
fusion could come together. We proposed a model that
combined abstract argumentation theory and a bounded
confidence opinion diffusion model and showed to what
extent it could explain variance of opinions, extremism,
coherence in collective decisions, and judgment accuracy
on arguments, given an ideal state of full information. The
second objective was to show in what way governance, pro-
viding agents with arenas of discussion and deliberation, was
important in addressing the success of collective decision-
making processes and the quality of their outcomes.
The model revealed that allowing for more deliberation
time, though in lower frequency, and allowing for wider
participation in deliberation increased the variance of opin-
ions and the proportion of extremists in a group. These
observations are consistent with the combination of results
found in [9] and in [13, 14], which stress that deliberation
may polarize groups and may have a meager effect on the
shifts of opinions, and inconsistent with [16] where it is
argued that opinions tend to moderate after deliberation.
It happens that deliberation alone did moderate opinion,
yet when integrated into a more complex system in which
individuals were allowed to interact with one another, and
not all that was deliberated was accepted, its influence was
shadowed by other more individualistic dynamics.
Undeniably, the grounded semantics played an important
role in the weak effect of deliberation since it models a
skeptical way of reasoning over arguments. For agents,
accepting arguments, thus updating their opinions accord-
ingly, happened not too often. Nevertheless, asking for more
deliberation did increase judgment accuracy, as observed in
[18], yet in a marginally decreasing fashion. We showed that
voting within the deliberation protocol not only increased
the proportion of extremists and the variance of opinions in
a group but also determined how coherent deliberation and
voting procedures were with each other. Lastly, we showed
that agents that are focused judged arguments better, had
more stable opinions, and constituted a group with higher
proportion of extremists than their naive counterparts.
In terms of governance, the model says that there is per-
haps no trade-off between extremismand judgment accuracy.
Instead, it asserts that the higher the variance of opinions, the
closer the group gets to the correct decisions. This situation
may be interpreted as Landermore and Page’s notion of “posi-
tive dissensus” (in complex collective decision-making tasks)
[36] as opposed to consensus as a normative requirement
for correct collective decision-making. If a decider has to
organize deliberation to legitimize a public policy, depending
on what kind of world he or she wants, different set of
parameters may be chosen to account for different levels of
legitimacy and correctness. For instance, one may ask for a
decision to be legitimate to respect a certain level of coherence
or of judgment accuracy and to be discussed by a sundry
of different-opinionated peoples. If so, deliberation has to
be made more often, more participants have to be included
in debates or in deliberation instances, and not too many
time steps should be introduced in between two deliberation
instances. So, the model may capture normative ideas to
define correct and legitimate collective decisions and to
make recommendations on those grounds. Requirements of
high consensual deliberative accuracy (judgment accuracy),
legitimacy (coherence), and diversity (variance of opinions)
are all taken into account, and for such a reason the model is
rather successful in describing a sound process of collective
decision-making with interpretable outcomes.
6.1. Extensions of the Model and Other Ideas. Our model can
be extended in many ways. Value-based abstract argumen-
tation frameworks (VAFs), for example, as an extension of
Dung’s argumentation framework, provide a formal descrip-
tion of the process of decision-making in which arguments
are given values and audiences (set of agents) ignore attacks
between arguments on the basis of their preferences over val-
ues. Social abstract argumentation frameworks (SAFs) also
provide an interesting and seemingly convenient formalism
for our model. In SAFs, agents vote on the acceptability of
arguments, and the resulting labeling is a combination of the
arguments that are voted for and labeling-based semantics. In
our model, we apply the same rule yet only for one argument
and given precise agent-based votingmechanisms and voting
rules, which are eventually parametrized.
To consider our model as a specification of a mixed VAF
and SAF model may be of great interest for future work.
This formalism can provide solid foundations to describe,
explain, interpret, and eventually extend the results found
here from an argument-based perspective. On those grounds,
future work will focus on creating a hybrid argumentation
framework—with its semantics—that takes heed of both:
values or principles and voting.
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Concerning other possible extensions of the model, a
natural reflex would be to argue on the validity and the
robustness of the mix between the bounded confidence
opinion diffusion models and deliberation. Consequentially,
adding deliberation to different bounded confidence models
of opinion diffusion such as the Hegelsmann-Krause model
[37] or to models of social impact theory like in [4] can
be of great interest for future work. We acknowledge that a
finer understanding of argumentation frameworks, random
lattices, and their respective applications for this model
are necessary. Testing for different labeling-based semantics,
or even trading labeling-based semantics for scoring-based
semantics (semantics that defines acceptability on scores
given to arguments) such as debate semantics and ranking-
based semantics (semantics that yield a preorder), may be
interesting to consider in future work.
More into modeling deliberation, it is not inadequate
to believe that agents may also advance proposals during
deliberation and replace, to some extent, the proposal for
which the deliberation is taking place. Endogenizing the
process that produces the type of argument to be deliberated
on may be interesting to explore either by having agents
strategically replace proposals at certain moments during
the debate or having the central authority attempt to choose
proposals such that the probability of having them accepted
is high. Agents may also be thought to be autoorganizing
(independent of a central authority) and concede on the size
of the instances of deliberation. To consider differences in
semantics across agents or even endogenizing the semantics
on how urgent or important the proposal that is being
discussed is can also be an interesting direction to take.
Last but not least, many nontrivial modifications of our
model are possible and most should include better-thought
deliberation protocols. It may be interesting to design and
observe protocols in which deliberation only affects agents
that are actually debating, for example. Trust, network effects,
multidimensionality of opinions, new processes of argument
exchange, or learning among agents are notions to further
develop in order to make the model more realistic and relax
some unreliable assumptions. In sum, the model is to be
refined and extended with the objective of either studying
concrete cases of deliberative polling and opinion dynamics
or implementing more intuitive thought experiments.
Appendix
We present below some of the pseudocode we used to
implement the model.
Algorithms:
(a) Algorithm 1 implements the dyadic influence in the
model. It describes how two agents interact and
update their opinions.
(b) Algorithm 2 implements the deliberative influence in
the model, which describes how agents update their
opinions in sight of the accepted deliberated proposal
arguments.
(c) Algorithm 3 is used to obtain the grounded labeling
of an argumentation framework.
(d) Algorithm 4 provides an overview of a run in the
simulations.𝑀 is the number of proposal arguments
to discuss, which we set to 100 in the model.
Each object in the system is indexed by a𝑤ℎ𝑜 number. Hence,
a set of agents is annotated by a set of natural numbers. We
use this fact in the implementation of the algorithm. 𝑂𝑏𝑗𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑖
denotes the object of 𝑤ℎ𝑜 number 𝑖. Agents’ opinions (𝑜) are
calibrated so that 𝑜 ∈ [−1, 1].
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Endnotes
1. In other words, the superiority of the “right answer”, or
labeling in our case, will appear as such to all.
2. All agents hold the same opinion.
3. By sensitivity, we mean how much an agent is ready to
change her opinion on the sole fact that an informational
cue has been debated on.
4. The assumption is strong, but this trust among agents
may be rooted from a genuine individual motivation to
reach a democratic consensus.
5. We adopted a rule of thumbs that says that if an agent
is neutral with respect to the principle, then she will
vote for any proposal that is presented to her during
deliberation.
6. If the argument is not unique, she chooses one at
random.
7. If there are more than one candidate, the agent will favor
the argument at minimal distance from 𝐼.
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Require: Vector of values for parameters (𝑉 = (𝜇, 𝑈, 𝑇))
Ensure: Successful interactions among agents𝑘 ←󳨀 0,𝑁𝑒 ←󳨀 0
while 𝑘 ≤ |𝑁|/2 do ⊳Fill𝑁𝑒 with |𝑁|/2 agents.𝑘 ←󳨀 𝑘 + 1,𝑁𝑒 ←󳨀 𝑅𝑎𝑛𝑑𝑜𝑚(|𝑁| + 1) ⊳Pseudo-random generator. Generates integer between 0 and |𝑁|.𝑁𝑟 ←󳨀 0, 𝛿𝑖,𝑗 ←󳨀 0 ⊳Variable to store differences in opinion.
for all 𝑖 ∈ 𝑁𝑒 do
Randomly pick a number 𝑗 ∈ 𝑁\(𝑁𝑒 ∪ 𝑁𝑟)𝑁𝑟 ←󳨀 𝑁𝑟 ∪ {𝑗}, 𝛿𝑖,𝑗 ←󳨀 |𝑜𝑖 − 𝑜𝑗|
procedure dyadic-update(𝑖, 𝑗) ⊳Two agents 𝑖 and 𝑗 discuss and update opinions.𝑜󸀠 ←󳨀 𝑜𝑖, (𝜇𝑗, 𝑈𝑗, 𝑇𝑗) ←󳨀 (𝜇𝑖, 𝑈𝑖, 𝑇𝑖) ←󳨀 (𝜇, 𝑈, 𝑇) ⊳Save agent i’s opinion before updating and homogenize agents.
if 𝛿𝑖,𝑗 < 𝑈𝑖 then𝑜𝑖 ←󳨀 𝜇𝑖𝑜𝑗 + (1 − 𝜇𝑖)𝑜𝑖
if 𝛿𝑖,𝑗 > 𝑇𝑖 then𝑜𝑖 ←󳨀 (1 + 𝜇𝑖)𝑜𝑖 − 𝜇𝑖𝑜𝑗
if 𝛿𝑖,𝑗 < 𝑈𝑗 then𝑜𝑗 ←󳨀 𝜇𝑗𝑜󸀠 + (1 − 𝜇𝑗)𝑜𝑗
if 𝛿𝑖,𝑗 > 𝑇𝑗 then𝑜𝑗 ←󳨀 (1 + 𝜇𝑗)𝑜𝑗 − 𝜇𝑗𝑜󸀠
Algorithm 1: Dyadic social influence.
Require: Vector of values for parameters (𝑉 = (𝛾, 𝑝𝑎, 𝑝𝑟))
Ensure: Successful interaction between proposal arguments and agents
for all 𝑖 ∈ 𝑁 do
procedure Probability-Update(V𝑎, 𝑝𝑎, 𝑝𝑟) ⊳Update individual probabilities of change due to deliberated cues𝑥𝑖 ←󳨀 𝑝|V𝑎−𝑜𝑖 |/2𝑎 , 𝑦𝑖 ←󳨀 𝑝2/|V𝑎−𝑜𝑖 |𝑟𝑞 ←󳨀 0
if L𝑎𝑏(𝐼) = 𝑖𝑛 then
procedure deliberative-update(𝑖, 𝑎) ⊳Agent i, argument 𝑎𝛾𝑖 ←󳨀 𝛾, 𝑞 ←󳨀 𝑢 ∼ U(0, 1) ⊳ 𝑢 is a realization of a uniform random variable
if 𝑞 < 𝑥𝑖 then𝑜𝑖 ←󳨀 𝛾𝑖𝑜𝑖 + (1 − 𝛾𝑖)V𝑎
break
if 𝑞 < 𝑦𝑖/(1 − 𝑥𝑖) then𝑜𝑖 ←󳨀 (1 + 𝛾𝑖)𝑜𝑖 − 𝛾𝑖V𝑎
Algorithm 2: Deliberation influence.
8. In terms of computational complexity, naive agentsmake
theirmoves in𝑂(|A𝑖| log(|A𝑖|)), while focused agents do
at least as bad.
9. Tables have memory. Therefore, debates are not neces-
sarily trees.
10. If there are less than (𝑛𝐷 × |𝑁|)/2 agents for any of both
groups, the CA summons all of them to the deliberation
table.
11. Or careful consideration of the viewpoints of others
which implies that citizens keep an open mind and do
not reject arguments outright.
12. A “healthy” consensus refers to the case in which many
consensual decisions are taken, but, opinion-wise, agents
do not agree with each other. Quotes are used on the
word healthy because some political science theorists
(e.g [36]) believe that, in certain situations, agreement in
opinions for deliberation is epistemologically damaging.
13. Simulations on groups of |𝑁| = 800 and |𝑁| = 400
agents shows that scaling the population has an effect on
all themetrics, but it is confounding depending onwhich
couples of attitudes structures are considered (𝑈, 𝑇). We
stick to |𝑁| = 400 as in [9] for comparability and
simulation running time.
14. By balanced wemean with as many arguments with V𝑎 <
0 as with V𝑎 > 0.
15. Experiments on the system suggest that a bigger
(smaller) argument pool 𝑀 = 1000 (𝑀 = 200) is
associated with a higher (lower) variance of opinions
(and extremism) and higher (lower) judgment accuracy.
For the rest of the observations, 𝑀 seem to have no
effect. We choose a middle value for 𝑀. Similarly, the
argument pool chosen to be balanced or uniformly
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Require: Argumentation framework 𝐴𝐹 = (A,R)
Ensure: Assignment of labels to arguments from the grounded labeling of 𝐴𝐹:L(A)
L0(A) ←󳨀 (0, 0, 0)𝑘 ←󳨀 0
do
𝑖𝑛 L𝑘+1(A) ←󳨀 𝑖𝑛 L𝑘(A) ∪ {𝑎 | 𝑎 is not labeled 𝑖𝑛 L𝑘(A), 𝑎𝑛𝑑 ∀𝑏 ∈ A 𝑠.𝑡 𝑏 R 𝑎 then 𝑏 ∈ 𝑜𝑢𝑡 L𝑘(A)}
𝑜𝑢𝑡 L𝑘+1(A) ←󳨀 𝑜𝑢𝑡 L𝑘(A) ∪ {𝑎 | 𝑎 is not labeled 𝑖𝑛 L𝑘(A), 𝑎𝑛𝑑 ∃𝑏 ∈ A 𝑠.𝑡 𝑏 R 𝑎 and 𝑏 ∈ 𝑖𝑛 L𝑘+1(A)}
while L𝑘+1(A) =L𝑘(A) = 0
Algorithm 3: Solve argumentation frameworks (with grounded semantics).
Require: Vector of values for parameters (𝑉)
Ensure: Vector of statistics (𝑈)
procedure Set-parameters(𝑉) ⊳Initialize parameters for scenario
procedure Init-objs(𝑛,𝑚, 𝑘, . . .) ⊳Create𝑚 arguments, 𝑛 agents, and 𝐴𝐹𝜀
procedure Solve-Argumentation-Framework(𝐴𝐹) ⊳Assigns the epistemic labelingL𝜀 toA𝑖 ←󳨀 1𝑡 ←󳨀 1
while 𝑖 ≤ 𝑀 do ⊳ 𝑀 the number of arguments to discuss𝐼𝑖 ←󳨀 𝐺𝑒𝑛 𝑎𝑟𝑔(1) ⊳Generates proposal argument 𝐼𝐴 𝑖,𝑡 ←󳨀 (𝐼𝑖, 0)
L𝑎𝑏(𝐼𝑖) ←󳨀 𝑢𝑛𝑑 ⊳Initialize label for 𝐼𝑗 ←󳨀 1 ⊳Initialize debate counter 𝑗
while ((L𝑎𝑏(𝐼) = 𝑢𝑛𝑑 ∨ 𝑚 ≤ 𝑗) ∧ 𝑗 ≤ 𝑚) do
if 𝑡 ≡ 0(𝑚𝑜𝑑 𝑡𝐷) then
procedure build-argumentation-framework(𝑛𝐷, 𝑏𝑒ℎ𝑎V𝑖𝑜𝑟) ⊳Build the argument graph, agents deliberate(𝐵𝑖,𝑡, 𝑆𝑖,𝑡) ←󳨀 (𝑋, 𝑌) ⊂ (⋃𝑙∈𝑁𝑛𝐷 A𝑙,𝑖,𝑡, ⋃𝑙∈𝑁𝑛𝐷 R𝑙,𝑖,𝑡) ⊳ 𝑁𝑛𝐷 ⊂ 𝑁 are agents sampled by the CA𝐴 𝑖,𝑡 ←󳨀 𝑑(𝐴 𝑖,𝑡, (𝐵𝑖,𝑡, 𝑆𝑖,𝑡))
procedure Solve-Argumentation-Framework(A𝑑) ⊳FindL(A𝑑)
L𝑎𝑏(𝐼𝑖) ←󳨀L𝑎𝑏𝐷(𝐼𝑖)𝑗 ←󳨀 𝑗 + 1
else𝑘 ←󳨀 1
while 𝑘 ≤ 𝑡𝐷 do
procedure dyadic-social-influence(𝜇, 𝑇, 𝑈) ⊳Agents discuss one-to-one𝑘 ←󳨀 𝑘 + 1𝑡 ←󳨀 𝑡 + 1
if 𝛼 > 0 ∧L𝑎𝑏(𝐼𝑖) ̸= 𝑜𝑢𝑡 then ⊳Agents vote for the proposal
if (|{𝑙 ∈ 𝑁|𝑜𝑙 × V𝐼𝑖 ≥ 0}| ≥ 𝛼 × 𝑛) then
L𝑎𝑏(𝐼𝑖) ←󳨀 𝑖𝑛
else
L𝑎𝑏(𝐼𝑖) ←󳨀 𝑜𝑢𝑡
if L𝑎𝑏(𝐼𝑖) = 𝑖𝑛 then
procedure Deliberation-influence(𝛾, 𝑝𝑎, 𝑝𝑟) ⊳Agents are influenced by the result of the decision process𝑖 ←󳨀 𝑖 + 1𝑡 ←󳨀 𝑡 + 1𝑈 ←󳨀 𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑢𝑡𝑒 𝑆𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑠(𝑉)
return 𝑈 ⊳Get the statistics
Algorithm 4: Run for one scenario.
generated does not seem to play a significant explanatory
role on any of the metrics.
16. Experiments show that themaximumnumber of debates
is not an important parameter even if it is an intuitive
one when considering decision-making processes. In
practice, debates end after at most 𝑚 + 1 deliberation
steps, and even then, it happens rarely. However, to avoid
unpleasant surprises like infinite debates on a complete
argument graph containing the proposal argument, we
added the constraint 𝑚. Its value is precisely 7 because
the biggest minimum number of debates we study
is 6.
30 Complexity
17. To ensure comparability with the deliberative andmixed
opinion dynamics models on judgment accuracy and
coherence, agents vote on proposal arguments every 𝑡𝐷×(𝑚+1). 𝑡𝐷 and𝑚does not explain variability in judgment
accuracy nor in coherence.
18. Student t-tests for independent samples are robust to
the violation of two hypothesis on the distribution of
the samples: normality and homogeneity of variances
as long as the sample size is big enough (central limit
theorem) and if the difference in size of the compared
samples is small,respectively.
19. Student’s test version forwhen variances are not assumed
equal and the difference in size of the compared samples
is big.
20. We do not correct for homoskedasticity nor normality of
errors in the estimates.
21. Balanced as the same number of runs per scenario or
such that no significant correlations are found between
parameters.
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